DD — DuPont de Nemours, Inc.
DuPont de Nemours, Inc. is a global provider of advanced materials and innovative solutions, serving markets across North America, Latin America, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and the Asia Pacific region. The company's operations are organized into three primary segments: Electronics & Industrial, Mobility & Materials, and Water & Protection.
Price chart & technical analysis
Loading chart…
As of 2026-09-13, DD traded at $126.94 (market cap ~$17.1B), roughly mid-way through its 52-week $92.49-$157.98 range, with RSI(14) at 29.2 and the shares 6-8% below every major moving average. That tape is down 12.0% in a month and 12.3% in three months, even though the company beat Q2 and raised full-year guidance on 2026-08-04.
The tape and the sell-side are pulling in opposite directions. The tape is clearly negative: as of 2026-09-13 the stock was -6.18% vs its 20-day SMA, -7.74% vs the 50-day, -7.27% vs the 200-day, with a -3.5% week, -12.04% month, -12.29% three-month and -5.72% six-month return and RSI at 29.16 - a broken uptrend, not a range. Nothing in the recent news justifies it: on 2026-08-04 DuPont beat with Q2 revenue of $1.82B (+4% organic) and adjusted EPS of $1.88 vs $1.76 consensus, posted $448M operating EBITDA (24.6% margin) at 127% free-cash-flow conversion, and raised FY26 adjusted EPS guidance to ~$7.24-$7.32. It also settled long-running PFAS claims with North Carolina and 11 local entities on 2026-09-10, announced a $250M Q3 buyback, and changed GICS classification to Industrials effective 2026-07-31. That last item is my best guess at the mechanical culprit: a sector reclassification forces Materials-sector funds to sell and Industrials mandates/index funds to buy, and that flow mismatch - plus macro caution into late-summer central bank meetings - can easily produce a 12% air-pocket with no fundamental deterioration. Sell-side sentiment remains constructive (roughly 24 Buys vs 1 Sell in the FMP breakdown), so the divergence is 'market bearish, analysts bullish'.
The reported 3-year trend is dominated by a structural break, not an operating one. The legacy company ran revenue of $2.9-$3.3B per quarter from Q3 2023 through Q3 2025 with operating income of $355-547M; then revenue collapsed from $3,072M (2025-09-30) to $1,693M (2025-12-31), a -45% sequential drop that lines up with the Electronics separation and Aramids divestiture, not demand. GAAP earnings through that transition were a mess: -$589M in Q1 2025, +$59M in Q2 2025, -$123M in Q3 2025, -$126M in Q4 2025. On the two clean post-spin quarters the picture is genuinely improving: Q1 2026 revenue $1,681M with $186M operating income (11.1% margin) and $161M GAAP net income ($1.17 EPS), then Q2 2026 revenue $1,819M (+8.2% QoQ) with $256M operating income (14.1% margin, +300bp QoQ) and $143M net income ($1.05 EPS, versus $1.88 adjusted). GAAP profitability has now inflected positive for two consecutive quarters after five quarters of spin/divestiture-driven losses. Cash is confirming it: H1 2026 operating cash flow of $553M against $178M capex for $375M of free cash flow, including $245M in Q2 alone versus $224M in the year-ago quarter on a revenue base 44% smaller - that is real conversion improvement, and the deterministic score's own accruals ratio of -0.85% (as of 2026-06-30) says cash is running slightly ahead of reported earnings, the healthy direction. Verdict: the revenue decline is structural/portfolio and permanent; the margin and earnings recovery is recent, sequential, and - with only two clean quarters - not yet proven, but it is an inflection rather than a blip.
Every trailing multiple in the FMP file is unusable and should be ignored: TTM P/E 275.96, PEG -0.147, EPS TTM $0.404, net margin 0.7%, ROE -5.6% - all artifacts of spinoff charges and a shrinking legacy earnings base, not economics. On forward numbers, DD at $126.94 is 17.4x the FY26 adjusted EPS guidance midpoint of $7.28 and roughly 10.5x FY26E EBITDA of about $1.76B (annualizing Q2's $448M at a 24.6% margin against ~$18.5B EV after ~$1.4B net debt). Those are fair, not cheap, multiples for a 4%-organic-growth specialty materials company with 24.6% EBITDA margins and sub-1x net leverage - a premium name like Ecolab or Xylem commands more, a cyclical industrial commands less. Versus its own history, the FMP 5-year average P/E of 14.63 and P/S of 1.46 make the current 17.4x forward P/E and 2.07x sales look rich, which is exactly why the deterministic engine tags this 'Rich vs. its own history' - but that history belongs to a pre-spin conglomerate carrying a PFAS overhang and a conglomerate discount that no longer exists, so I weight it lightly. Balance sheet and yield are supportive: 1.26x book, 0.227 debt/equity, 2.43 current ratio, 1.78% dividend yield on a ~31% payout. Bottom line: fair-to-slightly-full on clean earnings, cheap-to-fair on EV/EBITDA, with no valuation cushion to rescue a guidance miss.
The important tell here is that price fell ~12% over the last month while estimates went UP - that is multiple compression, not estimate cuts, which usually means the market is discounting something other than the earnings stream (sector-rotation flow from the 2026-07-31 GICS move to Industrials, rate/macro caution, or lingering spinoff-complexity discount). That setup can mean the gap closes quickly if Q3 confirms guidance. But apply a discount to the headline numbers: Q2 GAAP EPS was $1.05 versus $1.88 adjusted, and H1 GAAP EPS totaled only $2.22 against a full-year adjusted guide of $7.24-$7.32, meaning a large share of the 'beat' comes from add-backs (intangibles amortization, restructuring, spin costs). A beat on adjusted EPS is worth less than it looks; the harder evidence in the quarter was the $245M of free cash flow and the 127% conversion. So the playbook is: track free cash flow and organic growth, not the adjusted EPS headline, and note that FMP's own price-target field is contradictory and unreliable - it shows a $97 consensus with a $115.50 recent average from only 2 analysts, while the live brief cites an average target of $166.60-$171.00. I would not use either as an anchor.
As of 2026-09-13, RSI(14) was 29.16 - oversold - and the price of $126.94 sat 6.18% below the 20-day SMA, 7.74% below the 50-day and 7.27% below the 200-day, with the 200-day also above the shorter averages. That is a broad downtrend with no base, not a range. The stock is only a little above the midpoint of its $92.49-$157.98 52-week range, so it is not washed out in absolute terms. Implication for timing: oversold readings inside a downtrend are notoriously unreliable entry signals, and there is no confirmation of a bottom yet. Momentum/quant funds that sell on moving-average breaks are still in sell mode, and the GICS-related rebalancing flow may not be finished. A patient buyer would want to see RSI reclaim roughly 45-50 and the price reclaim the 20-day (near $135 by mid-September arithmetic) before treating this as a trend change; an oversold bounce off $120-125 is plausible but should not be mistaken for a reversal. These are point-in-time figures from 2026-09-13 and will be stale in weeks, not months.
- Interest rates and central bank posture: a 4%-organic-growth compounder is duration-sensitive, and high rates both compress its multiple and raise the financing cost of the $1B+ bolt-on M&A war chest management has flagged for healthcare packaging.
- Index and sector-flow mechanics: the 2026-07-31 GICS reclassification from Materials to Industrials forces sector funds and index trackers to rebalance, creating forced supply that has nothing to do with fundamentals - a plausible driver of the recent 12% drawdown.
- Water infrastructure and biopharma capex: global water upgrades (RO membranes, ion exchange) and bioprocessing consumables are multi-year structural tailwinds for the post-spin portfolio, though Middle East water project timing delays are already a documented headwind management had to offset with healthcare strength.
- Chemical regulation and PFAS/ESG scrutiny: the 2026-09-10 North Carolina settlement removes one large overhang, but state and federal environmental compliance costs and any remaining claimant jurisdictions stay in the institutional risk model.
- Global industrial demand cycle: Industrial Technologies (specialty films and consumables) is levered to manufacturing PMIs, and a weak global industrial backdrop is the single biggest threat to the 'above 4% organic' full-year target.
- Q3 2026 earnings on 2026-11-10: guidance is $1.80-$1.90 EPS on ~$1.835B sales; a third consecutive beat would validate the raised FY26 $7.24-$7.32 range and could close the multiple-compression gap.
- Capital deployment: completion of the $250M Q3 buyback authorization plus progress on the $1B+ earmarked for healthcare-packaging bolt-ons - accretive M&A would be a re-rating trigger.
- PFAS de-risking after the 2026-09-10 North Carolina and 11-entity settlement: any further jurisdictional settlements or finalization details reduce the tail liability that has historically kept a discount on the shares.
- Margin trajectory: sustaining Q2's 24.6% adjusted EBITDA margin and building toward the high-20s would justify a multiple closer to water/pure-play specialty peers.
- Normalization of index/flow dynamics once the Industrials reclassification rebalancing is complete, which would remove a non-fundamental source of selling.
- The adjusted-versus-GAAP gap: Q2 2026 GAAP EPS was $1.05 against $1.88 adjusted, and H1 GAAP EPS of $2.22 versus a $7.24-$7.32 full-year adjusted guide means heavy recurring add-backs (amortization, restructuring, spin costs). 'Beats' on this basis may overstate true economic earnings.
- Organic growth of only ~4% with documented Middle East water project timing delays and soft industrial demand - a miss on the guidance raise would be punished hard given the stock is not cheap on forward earnings.
- Residual PFAS and environmental liability beyond the 2026-09-10 North Carolina settlement, which resolves NC and 11 local entities but not every jurisdiction or claimant class.
- Broken technicals with no base: price below the 20/50/200-day averages and RSI at 29 as of 2026-09-13 means momentum-driven selling can continue well past the point where value buyers step in.
- Execution risk in a freshly reshaped portfolio: only two clean post-spin quarters, a GICS reclassification in July 2026, and bolt-on M&A to integrate, all with a short track record for the new DuPont.
This is a better business than its trailing statements make it look and a worse bargain than its bulls imply. Post-spin DuPont is a 24.6%-EBITDA-margin specialty materials company with healthcare and water end markets growing ~4% organically, ~$1.4B net debt against ~$1.76B EBITDA (under 1x leverage), a 1.78% dividend and a recent major litigation overhang resolved - trading at 17.4x clean FY26 adjusted EPS and ~10.5x EV/EBITDA. My math puts fair value near $146, so there is real but moderate upside, not the 30%+ the sell-side targets imply. Against that: a wide GAAP-to-adjusted earnings gap, 4% growth that is not obviously accelerating, a 'rich versus its own history' tag, and a downtrend with RSI at 29 and no base. I would not chase it here, but it belongs on a watchlist - the risk/reward improves materially on a technical base or after the 2026-11-10 print confirms the guidance.
I applied 20.0x to FY2026 adjusted EPS of $7.30 (the $7.24-$7.32 guidance midpoint) for $146, and cross-checked it with an EV/EBITDA approach: 12.0x FY2026E EBITDA of ~$1.76B (annualizing Q2 2026's $448M at a 24.6% margin) gives a $21.1B enterprise value, less ~$1.4B net debt ($3.13B long-term debt against $1.74B cash) leaves ~$19.7B equity, or ~$146 per share on the ~135M diluted shares implied by the $143M Q2 net income / $1.05 EPS. The 20x P/E is justified as a modest premium to DD's pre-spin 14.63x average (that multiple reflected a conglomerate discount and PFAS overhang that the 2026-09-10 settlement and portfolio pruning have largely removed) but a discount to premium water/biopharma specialty peers, appropriate for a 24.6%-margin, sub-1x-levered business growing ~4% organically.
The 52.1 'Fair Fundamentals' band is directionally defensible but understates the go-forward company, and the deterministic notes list itself admits why: revenue moved -45% between 2025-09-30 and 2025-12-31 because of the Electronics separation and Aramids divestiture, so the growth leg (18.5) and quality leg (43.9) are being computed through a structural break the formula cannot see past, while three of the last five quarters carried negative GAAP net income (-$589M, -$123M, -$126M) on spin/divestiture charges. Those same charges make TTM P/E (275.96), PEG (-0.147) and ROE (-5.6%) meaningless, and they make the 'Rich vs. its own history' tag a comparison against a pre-spin conglomerate (5y avg P/E 14.63, P/S 1.46) that no longer exists. On the two clean post-spin quarters the business is: ~$1.68-$1.82B quarterly revenue, positive GAAP EPS in both ($1.17 and $1.05), 24.6% adjusted EBITDA margin, $375M H1 free cash flow, 0.227 debt/equity, $1.74B cash against $3.13B long-term debt, a raised FY26 guide of $7.24-$7.32, a $250M buyback, and a dated 2026-09-10 PFAS settlement with North Carolina and 11 local entities that is exactly the kind of event a trailing-data formula cannot price. Note the score's own financial-health leg already reflects the balance sheet at 86.3, so the distortion is concentrated in growth and quality. I would put the fair score in the low 60s - one band higher - which keeps me at Partially Agree rather than Agree; I am not moving to Disagree because the technicals are genuinely broken, the GAAP-to-adjusted earnings gap is large, and 4% growth does not deserve a premium multiple.
AI-generated analysis for informational purposes only, not financial advice.