EIX — Edison International
Headquartered in Rosemead, California, and established in 1886, Edison International primarily operates through its subsidiaries to produce and supply electrical power. This utility company furnishes electricity to a vast client base of around 15 million, encompassing homes, businesses, industrial sites, governmental bodies, and agricultural enterprises throughout Southern, Central, and Coastal California.
Price chart & technical analysis
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As of 2026-09-13, Edison International traded at $56.00 (market cap ~$21.5B), still reeling from a ~23-24% single-session crash in late August/early September after California's SB 492 wildfire-liability-limitation bill collapsed. The stock sat 21.3% below its 50-day SMA and 18.2% below its 200-day SMA, with RSI(14) at 33.7 - deeply damaged technically but not yet formally oversold.
The market's mood is dominated by one thing: the weekend of Aug 30-31, 2026 failure of SB 492, which would have capped utility exposure to insurer subrogation lawsuits after wildfires. That single legislative outcome erased roughly a quarter of EIX's market value in a day and re-opened an unquantifiable liability the market had partially priced out. The damage shows up in the tape and the sell side: EIX returned -19.31% in the month and -23.24% in the three months ending 2026-09-13, analyst price targets were cut roughly 8.6% to ~$69.21 (FMP's consensus sits at $67, recent average $71.86), and the FMP rating breakdown now shows 4 outright Sell ratings against 0 Strong Buys (15 Buy / 18 Hold / 4 Sell). Notably, this happened despite a genuinely solid Q2 2026 report (July 30) - core EPS of $1.54 vs $0.97 a year earlier, with FY2026 core EPS guidance of $5.90-$6.20 reaffirmed. When a stock ignores good earnings, it's trading on tail risk, not on the income statement.
Strip out the noise and the underlying utility is growing modestly; the reported numbers are simply too messy to read literally. Trailing-4-quarter revenue (Q3 2025-Q2 2026) of $19,423M is up ~10.7% versus the prior four quarters ($17,539M), but the two most recent prints are contradictory: Q1 2026 revenue of $4,103M was +7.7% YoY, while Q2 2026 revenue of $4,357M was actually -4.1% YoY versus $4,543M. GAAP EPS is the real problem for any trend read - the series runs $0.40 (Q3 2023), -$0.03 (Q1 2024), $3.72 (Q1 2025), $0.89 (Q2 2025), $2.16 (Q3 2025), $4.78 (Q4 2025), $1.37 (Q1 2026) and $1.38 (Q2 2026). The $3.72 and $4.78 quarters are clearly one-time inflated (Q4 2025 even reported NEGATIVE gross profit of -$412M alongside $1,845M of net income and only $899M of operating income - impossible without a large below-the-line item), which is why the trailing P/E of 5.76 and TTM EPS of $9.97 are meaningless. The clean signal is core EPS: Q2 2026's $1.54 versus $0.97 a year ago, driven by the 2025 General Rate Case final decision, with FY2026 guidance of $5.90-$6.20 intact. Verdict: core earnings are steadily improving at a mid-single-digit-plus pace; GAAP is inflected by one-offs in both directions; and free cash flow is structurally negative - EIX burned roughly $2.1B of FCF over the trailing twelve quarters (Q3 2023-Q2 2026), with capex running $1.5-1.9B per quarter against operating cash flow of $0.9-2.1B. That deficit has been funded with debt: long-term debt rose from $29.5B (Q3 2023) to $37.1B (Q2 2026), a ~$7.6B increase in three years.
On any clean forward basis, EIX is cheap - but the cheapness is the market pricing a liability, not a mispricing. As of 2026-09-13, at $56.00 the stock trades at 9.1x the $6.134 next-FY consensus EPS and 9.3x the midpoint of management's own FY2026 core guidance ($6.05). That compares with a 5-year average P/E of 25.13x and a regulated-electric peer group that typically clears in the mid-teens forward. Price/sales of 1.109x sits below the 5-year average of 1.55x, price/book of 1.23x is well under the 1.5-2.0x range most regulated utilities enjoy (ROE of 25.9% is strong by utility standards, though ROIC of 6.3% is normal-to-soft for the sector), and EV/EBITDA of 8.3x is undemanding. The trailing PEG of 0.136 and trailing P/E of 5.76 should be ignored outright - they're built on one-off-inflated TTM EPS. The honest read: roughly a 35-40% discount to peers on forward earnings and book, which is exactly what you'd expect for a utility with uncapped wildfire litigation exposure and no legislative fix. Cheap versus its own history, yes - but a justified discount, not a free one.
Right now the price is not trading on earnings at all - it's trading on a binary legal/regulatory question, and that's the key thing an investor needs to internalize. Consensus forward EPS of $6.134 implies only 5-7% utility-grade growth, so in a normal world a 9x multiple would be absurdly low and a re-rate to 13-15x (i.e., $80-92) would be the obvious trade. But the market is telling you that if a major fire or an adverse subrogation ruling lands before a legislative or reinsurance solution does, EPS guidance becomes irrelevant and 5-6x earnings ($30-37) is live. Concretely: the bear case doesn't need earnings to fall, it needs the multiple to stay crushed or compress further; the bull case doesn't need an earnings beat either, it needs Sacramento or the courts to cap the tail. Watch headlines, not the estimate revisions.
As of 2026-09-13, the technical picture is broken, not merely weak. RSI(14) stood at 33.73 - approaching but not below the classic 30 oversold threshold - and the price sat 14.75% below its 20-day SMA (implied ~$65.7), 21.30% below its 50-day SMA (~$71.2) and 18.21% below its 200-day SMA (~$68.5). Losing the 200-day by this much on a single event is a trend change, not a dip. Returns were -1.36% over one week, -19.31% over one month, -23.24% over three months and -21.93% over six months, with the $56 print near the bottom of the $52-$81.62 52-week range. Entry-timing implication: this is knife-catching territory. Event-driven gap-downs of this magnitude typically need weeks of sideways base-building before they bottom, and the ~$65-72 zone (20/50/200-day cluster) is now overhead supply that any rally must absorb. There is no technical confirmation of a low yet.
- Interest rates: with $37.1B of long-term debt and a multi-billion-dollar annual capex program funded largely with new issuance, EIX's financing cost is directly levered to the 10-year Treasury; elevated baseline rates inflate interest expense and compress the multiple utilities trade at.
- California regulation and CPUC dynamics: rate outcomes (the 2025 GRC decision is the current earnings driver) and any CPUC disallowance or prudence review are the primary determinant of allowed ROE and rate base growth.
- Wildfire liability and insurance market structure: the SB 492 failure leaves SCE exposed to subrogation claims from insurers, and the adequacy/solvency of California's existing Wildfire Fund is now an open question that directly drives EIX's cost of capital.
- Electrification load growth: state-mandated EV adoption, building decarbonization and rising data-center demand are genuine secular tailwinds to rate base, but only if the balance sheet survives the liability overhang.
- Defensive sector rotation: utilities are a bond-proxy haven in risk-off markets, but EIX is currently being excluded from that trade because its idiosyncratic wildfire risk overwhelms its defensive characteristics (beta of 0.614 notwithstanding).
- Q3 2026 earnings, expected late October 2026 - the first full quarter post-SB 492 and management's first real platform to address liquidity, financing plans and any change to the $5.90-$6.20 FY2026 core EPS guidance.
- Any renewed California legislative or regulatory effort on wildfire liability caps, reinsurance backstops or Wildfire Fund adequacy - the single highest-leverage positive catalyst, though the 2026 session has closed, pushing real action toward 2027.
- Appellate rulings or settlement announcements on outstanding wildfire claims/subrogation suits - a credible, quantified settlement would convert an open-ended liability into a number the market can discount.
- CPUC proceedings on SCE's wildfire mitigation and risk-management framework, including any changes to insurance coverage availability or prudency treatment.
- Balance-sheet actions - incremental debt issuance, equity issuance/dilution, or asset sales would signal how management is funding the capex program against the liability overhang.
- Uncapped wildfire liability: the collapse of SB 492 removed the most plausible near-term legislative cap on insurer subrogation claims, leaving SCE exposed to potentially unlimited damages from future (and existing) fires.
- Balance-sheet fragility: $37.1B of long-term debt, debt/equity of 2.484, a current ratio of 0.662, only $242M of cash against $11.1B of current liabilities, and free cash flow negative in 9 of the last 12 quarters leaves very little cushion to absorb a large adverse liability outcome.
- Persistent negative free cash flow and funding risk: roughly $2.1B of cumulative FCF destruction over the trailing twelve quarters means continued reliance on capital markets; a credit downgrade or a spike in borrowing costs would compound the problem.
- Regulatory and political risk: a CPUC disallowance, adverse prudence finding, or a shift in California's cost-allocation politics could hit allowed returns directly.
- Dividend sustainability: the 4.568% yield is well-covered by core earnings but not by cash flow, so a severe liability outcome or a forced equity raise puts the payout at risk.
EIX is not a buy here for most individual investors - not because the business is bad, but because the thesis is no longer about the business. It is a well-run regulated utility with improving core EPS ($1.54 in Q2 2026 vs $0.97 a year ago), reaffirmed FY2026 guidance of $5.90-$6.20, a 4.57% dividend yield and a genuinely undemanding 9.1x forward P/E - but the stock lost nearly a quarter of its value in a day because Sacramento failed to cap wildfire subrogation exposure, and that single question now dominates the multiple. You are being paid to underwrite a legal and political outcome, not an earnings stream, and the balance sheet ($37.1B debt, 0.66 current ratio, negative FCF in 9 of 12 quarters) offers little room for error if that outcome is bad. Wait for either a confirmed technical base with management's Q3 liquidity commentary, or concrete evidence of a state-level liability solution, before committing capital.
Primary method is forward P/E: 11.0x applied to blended forward core EPS of $6.13 (2026 guidance midpoint $6.05 and 2027 consensus $6.134) = $67.4, which embeds a ~30% discount to the mid-teens regulated-electric peer group for the uncapped wildfire liability; averaging that with a dividend-discount cross-check ($2.56 implied DPS / (8.75% cost of equity - 4.5% growth) = $60.2) yields $63.8, rounded to $64.00. A 30/50/20 bull/base/bear scenario weighting (re-rate to 13x on a liability fix = ~$80; status quo at 10.5x = ~$64; large-fire/adverse-ruling tail at 7x = ~$43) independently lands at ~$64.4, confirming the figure.
The deterministic score's 'Weak Fundamentals' band is directionally defensible on the balance sheet but too harsh as an overall verdict, and I'd move it up roughly 10-13 points into the low-40s. Three things the formula can't see: (1) it is entirely backward-looking, so it structurally cannot price the Aug 30-31, 2026 SB 492 collapse - a discrete, dated legislative event that created a forward liability no trailing ratio captures; (2) its inputs are polluted by one-off distortions, since TTM EPS of $9.97 (and the resulting 5.76x trailing P/E) is inflated by the Q1 2025 ($3.72) and Q4 2025 ($4.78, with negative gross profit) quarters, while the clean core run-rate is ~$6.05 for 2026; (3) the ratio screener (15.6) penalizes structurally normal utility traits - a 0.66 current ratio, 2.484 debt/equity and a 1.236 P/B are ordinary for a regulated electric holding company with $96B of assets, not signs of distress. That said, I would NOT push the score much higher: the negative free cash flow, the $7.6B three-year debt build and the thin $242M cash position are real and, if anything, matter MORE now that the wildfire liability is uncapped - which is why this lands on 'Partially Agree' rather than 'Agree.'
AI-generated analysis for informational purposes only, not financial advice.