EL — The Estée Lauder Companies Inc.
The Estée Lauder Companies Inc. is a global entity dedicated to the development, marketing, and sale of a diverse range of premium beauty and personal care items worldwide. Its extensive product catalog encompasses numerous offerings across four primary categories.
Price chart & technical analysis
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As of 2026-09-13, EL trades at $97.12 (market cap ~$35.1B), about 20% below its 52-week high of $121.64 and ~47% above the low of $66.22, after a ~15% post-earnings relief rally in August gave back 6.5% in the week into this date. FY26 (ended 2026-06-30) marked the inflection: revenue +5% reported to ~$15.05B, adjusted operating margin +320bps to 11.2%, FCF nearly doubled to $1.32B — but GAAP TTM EPS is still only $0.50, so the stock trades at ~29x forward, not trailing, earnings.
Sentiment has clearly improved off a bearish base but is not bullish: the 2026-08-19 Q4 FY26 print (adjusted EPS $0.39 vs $0.32 consensus; revenue $3.63B vs $3.55B) drove a 15%+ relief rally and pushed targets up (JPM and Goldman clustered near $112, Citi at $115, Barclays at $97), and EL was still up 10.77% over the month into 2026-09-13. But the tape cooled hard into this date — down 6.49% in the past week with RSI-14 at 51.52, i.e. dead neutral — and the rating distribution remains skeptical: 1 strong buy and 19 buys against 22 holds and 4 sells, consensus 'Hold,' with the $102.27 consensus target only ~5% above the $97.12 price as of 2026-09-13. The market believes the turnaround has started; it has not yet agreed to pay much more than ~$100 for it.
The revenue trend is a textbook inflection, not a blip. Quarterly YoY went -4.5% (Sep'24), -6.4% (Dec'24), -9.9% (Mar'25), -12.0% (Jun'25) — the trough — then flipped to +3.6% (Sep'25), +5.8% (Dec'25), +4.6% (Mar'26), +6.2% (Jun'26), with the seasonally largest December quarter at $4.238B. Operating margin also bottomed and recovered: FY25 quarters printed -3.6%, -14.5%, +8.6%, +0.2%, versus FY26's +4.9%, +13.9%, +9.6%, -9.2%. That last number needs context rather than panic: Q4 FY26 revenue of $3.618B carried a *higher* gross margin (80.9%) than any quarter in the past three years, so the -$334M GAAP operating loss sits below the gross line and reflects restructuring/impairment charges tied to concluding the Profit Recovery and Growth Plan, not demand destruction — adjusted EPS for that same quarter was $0.39 and beat by $0.07. Cash is the tell: FY26 FCF of $1.316B (Sep -$436M, Dec +$1,017M, Mar +$310M, Jun +$425M) versus $670M in FY25, with the accruals ratio at -3.5% as of 2026-06-30 meaning net income is running *behind* operating cash flow. Long-term debt fell from $8.974B (Dec'25) to $6.778B (Jun'26). Structural improvement, still reported through a very noisy GAAP P&L.
Not cheap, and 'fair' is the generous read. The trailing P/E of 194.24 and the 5-year average P/E of 90.7 are both artifacts of collapsed GAAP earnings and carry no information. The live numbers that matter as of 2026-09-13: $97.12 against FY27 consensus EPS of $3.32 (company guidance $3.10–$3.35) is ~29x forward, with a 1.37% dividend yield. Price/sales of 2.33x sits below the 5-year average of 3.19x, which is the one genuinely supportive datapoint — but that 3.19x average was set when the company grew faster and earned more. On adjusted FY27 EBITDA of roughly $2.8B against an enterprise value near $38.4B ($35.1B market cap + $6.78B long-term debt - $3.50B cash), the stock is around 13–14x adjusted EBITDA — reasonable, not a bargain. Verdict: priced for the recovery to be delivered, roughly at fair value, with essentially no cushion.
The share price is doing the work that earnings haven't yet done. GAAP TTM EPS is $0.50 while the FY27 guide is $3.10–$3.35 — the market is paying ~29x a number that requires roughly a 6x step-up in reported profit, funded by PRGP savings ($1.2B gross benefits), a 12.7–13.5% adjusted operating margin, and China/travel-retail normalization. That means the stock is priced for execution, not for hope, but also that there is little tolerance for slippage: if the Q1 FY27 print (late Oct/early Nov 2026) misses the accelerated first-half growth framing, the multiple compresses quickly toward the $66–80 zone it occupied when the turnaround was doubted. The single most important number to watch is not adjusted EPS but the gap between GAAP and adjusted — $780M of FY26 GAAP operating income versus roughly $1.69B adjusted implies ~$0.9B of add-backs. Shrinking that gap converts the story from credible to proven; a persistent gap means the market is paying a premium multiple on earnings the company keeps redefining.
Range-bound with a recovering bias, and no urgency to chase. As of 2026-09-13: RSI-14 at 51.52 (neutral, not overbought and not oversold), price 1.73% *below* the 20-day (~$98.8), but 7.97% *above* the 50-day (~$90.0) and 5.01% *above* the 200-day (~$92.5). Returns of +10.77% (1mo), +8.30% (3mo) and +10.51% (6mo) against -6.49% (1wk) describe a rally that just paused rather than one that has broken. The constructive read is that the stock is holding above both medium-term averages after a 15% earnings gap; the cautious read is that the 20-day has rolled over and the 50/200-day cluster at $90–93 is the real shelf. Practical implication: buying at $97.12 buys you a stock sitting in the middle of its own range with the nearest meaningful support ~5–8% lower. The risk-reward is meaningfully better on a retest of $89–93 than at this price.
- Mainland China prestige-beauty demand: EL grew organic sales 9% in mainland China in FY26 and took share, but that growth is running against a soft Chinese consumer — a genuine slowdown there removes the largest single leg of the recovery thesis.
- Travel retail normalization: roughly 15% of reported sales, with Asian duty-free still working through concession handovers (China Duty Free, Avolta) and inventory resets — helpful now, but a channel that has repeatedly surprised to the downside since 2022.
- Rates and leverage: $6.778B of long-term debt against just $3.806B of stockholders' equity (D/E 2.43) makes refinancing costs material, though the $2.2B paydown between Dec'25 and Jun'26 plus $3.498B of cash is real deleveraging; falling rates would help more than they would for a typical staples name.
- Tariffs, FX and input costs against a 75.5% gross margin: currency translation across renminbi/euro/yen and any tariff pass-through land directly on a P&L that still only converts 1.2% of revenue to GAAP net income.
- Sector positioning: with a beta of 1.274, EL trades more like a discretionary recovery story than a Consumer Defensive staple, so it is exposed to rotation out of high-multiple recovery names if the macro tone shifts.
- Q1 FY27 earnings, expected late October/early November 2026 — the first hard test of guided 3–5% organic growth and 12.7–13.5% adjusted operating margin, and the event most likely to either validate or break the ~29x forward multiple as of 2026-09-13.
- Further balance-sheet repair: additional long-term debt reduction or a resumption of buybacks would lift EPS mechanically given equity of only $3.806B.
- Digital/brand execution: The Ordinary approaching $1B in annual sales, Amazon expansion across 13 brands, and TikTok Shop/Shopify omnichannel rollouts highlighted at the 2026-09-09 Barclays conference — the proof points for a structurally lower cost-to-serve.
- China and Asia travel-retail comps continuing to normalize through FY27 (~15% of sales), which would raise the quality of the revenue mix, not just the level.
- Sell-side convergence upward: with targets spread from $86 to $120 (JPM/Goldman ~$112, Citi $115, Barclays $97), consecutive beats would pull the whole distribution up and the consensus 'Hold' toward 'Buy.'
- Execution risk on the margin story: FY26 GAAP operating income was only $780M (5.2% margin) and Q4 FY26 posted a -$334M GAAP operating loss. If restructuring-style add-backs keep recurring, the $3.10–$3.35 FY27 adjusted EPS guide loses credibility and the multiple follows it down.
- Valuation risk: at $97.12 as of 2026-09-13 the stock is ~29x FY27E EPS for a business guiding 3–5% organic growth — one soft quarter re-rates it toward the $66–80 range where it sat before the inflection was believed.
- China and travel-retail concentration: a renewed Chinese consumer slowdown or another duty-free destocking cycle would hit the two areas most responsible for the FY26 recovery.
- Balance sheet cushion is thin: current ratio 1.222 and quick ratio 0.901, with long-term debt of $6.778B versus equity of $3.806B, and the September quarter is structurally FCF-negative (-$436M in Sep'25, -$811M in Sep'24) — a bad working-capital quarter has little slack behind it.
- Competitive intensity: indie and creator-led brands plus mass-market trade-down pressure prestige pricing; the 75.5% gross margin is the moat, and it is the first thing to erode if share has to be bought.
The turnaround is real, not a value trap: revenue bottomed at -12.0% YoY in the June 2025 quarter and has run +3.6%, +5.8%, +4.6%, +6.2% since; adjusted operating margin expanded 320bps to 11.2%; FY26 free cash flow nearly doubled to $1.32B; and $2.2B of long-term debt was repaid in two quarters. But at $97.12 on 2026-09-13, you are paying ~29x FY27E EPS of ~$3.30 for 3–5% organic growth while GAAP net margin is still 1.2% — the first leg of the recovery is priced in, and the second leg has not been proven. This is a hold and a watch-list name, not a buy at this level; the risk-reward improves materially on a pullback into the $89–93 moving-average support, or after the Q1 FY27 print confirms the margin guide.
I blended three approaches, all anchored to the FY27 (June 2027) estimates: (1) 28x my FY2027 adjusted EPS estimate of $3.30 (company guidance $3.10–$3.35, consensus $3.32) = $92.40 — a premium multiple justified by a 75.5% gross margin, an iconic brand portfolio and mid-teens operating-margin ambition, but discounted from the ~30.7x implied by the $102 consensus target for 3–5% organic growth and $6.78B of long-term debt; (2) 13.5x FY27E adjusted EBITDA of ~$2.85B against an enterprise value bridge of $3.50B cash and $6.78B long-term debt = ~$97; and (3) a 4.5% normalized free-cash-flow yield on ~$1.55B of FY27E FCF = ~$95. Those three average to roughly $93, which is my fair value as of 2026-09-13 — about 4% below the $97.12 price, consistent with a stock that has already been paid for the first leg of its recovery.
The 46.9 'Fair Fundamentals' band is directionally right but a few points too harsh, and the reason is exactly the distortion a fixed formula cannot see. The quality/profitability leg (46.3) is computed on GAAP figures for the TTM ended 2026-06-30: operating margin 5.2%, net margin 1.2%, ROIC 1.9% — numbers gutted by roughly $0.9B of FY26 restructuring and impairment charges (GAAP operating income of $780M versus ~$1.69B adjusted). The formula's own accruals leg flags the opposite of an earnings-quality problem: -3.5%, i.e. cash flow running ahead of reported income, with FY26 FCF nearly doubling to $1.32B and long-term debt falling $2.2B in two quarters. Re-running the quality and financial-health legs on adjusted margins would put the score in the mid-to-high 50s — still inside 'Fair Fundamentals,' so I would move the number up without moving the band. I would not push further: the ratio screener's penalties (P/B 9.3 on a $3.8B equity base, EV/EBITDA 48.4 on GAAP EBITDA, quick ratio 0.901) reflect genuine leverage, and the 12.7–13.5% FY27 margin guide is still unproven. No deviation from the mandated band/valuation mapping is warranted — the 2026-08-19 earnings beat is already reflected in the trailing data and is not the kind of discrete, structurally invisible event (M&A, bankruptcy, restatement) that justifies overriding the table.
AI-generated analysis for informational purposes only, not financial advice.