KDP — Keurig Dr Pepper Inc.
Keurig Dr Pepper Inc. is a prominent beverage firm with operations spanning both the United States and global markets. The company structures its business across four primary divisions: Coffee Systems, Packaged Beverages, Beverage Concentrates, and Latin America Beverages.
Price chart & technical analysis
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As of 2026-09-13, KDP traded at $31.39 with a $42.7bn market cap, an RSI(14) of 47.5, sitting 7.41% above its 200-day SMA but 1.47% below its 20-day after a -3.68% week, roughly upper-middle of a $24.88-$33.82 52-week range. The stock just absorbed a Q2'26 report that beat on revenue and adjusted EPS but showed a GAAP margin collapse driven by the JDE Peet's consolidation, with the company reaffirming guidance and targeting a corporate split in early 2027.
As of 2026-09-13 the tape is neutral-but-constructive rather than enthusiastic. KDP was +14.52% over six months and +6.19% over one month, but -1.01% over three months and -3.68% over the last week, with RSI at 47.5 - the market has absorbed the Q2'26 beat (net sales $7.31bn vs $7.23bn consensus; adjusted EPS $0.57 vs $0.54) and the 2026-09-10 Barclays conference confirmation that the $400m three-year JDE Peet's synergy target is being captured, without chasing the stock. Wall Street is more positive than the price action: consensus Buy (17 Buy / 11 Hold / 0 Sell), average price target $37.75 with a $30-$42 range, and recent-cohort average of $38.86. That gap between analyst targets and a stock stuck near $31 is the market pricing in real leverage and split-execution risk that sell-side targets gloss over.
Through 2023-2025 KDP was a steady, low-variance compounder: quarterly revenue ranged from $3.47bn (Q1'24) to $4.50bn (Q4'25), FY25 revenue of $16.60bn was up about 8.2% on FY24's $15.35bn, and gross margin held in a tight 54-56% band (Q3'25 54.3%, Q4'25 53.8%). Q2'26 is a step-change, not organic acceleration: revenue jumped to $7.31bn (+75.6% YoY) purely because JDE Peet's consolidated, and gross margin fell to 41.9% from 54.2%, operating margin collapsed to 9.2% from 21.6%, and GAAP EPS fell to $0.044 from $0.40 - almost entirely acquisition accounting (intangible amortization plus deal and integration costs) rather than a demand problem, since adjusted EPS beat at $0.57 and full-year guidance was reaffirmed. Standalone organic growth was mid-single-digit to low-double-digit (Q4'25 +10.5% YoY; Q2'25 +6.1%). Treat the GAAP margin and EPS collapse as a transient accounting event with a multi-quarter tail, not a structural decay - but note it makes trailing GAAP multiples (31.6x P/E on $1.049 TTM EPS) actively misleading. The cleaner trend line is cash: TTM free cash flow of about $1.97bn (Q2'26 $714m, Q1'26 $165m, Q4'25 $566m, Q3'25 $527m) with normal seasonal swing, and an accruals ratio of -0.86% as of 2026-06-30, meaning cash generation is running ahead of reported net income - the conservative pattern, not the warning one.
Cheap on forward earnings and cash flow, fair-to-unremarkable on the balance sheet. As of 2026-09-13 the stock at $31.39 screens two ways. Trailing: 31.6x P/E on GAAP EPS of $1.049 with a meaningless -2.72 PEG (the trailing base is depressed by amortization and one-offs, including a -$0.11 GAAP quarter in Q4'24); 2.13x sales versus a 5-year average of 3.2x; 1.71x book against an 8.1% ROE. Forward: $31.39 divided by next-FY estimated EPS of $2.292 equals 13.7x, less than half the 25.9x 5-year average trailing P/E and at the low end of large-cap staples. On cash it looks better still: roughly $1.97bn TTM free cash flow on a $42.7bn market cap is a ~4.6% FCF yield on top of a 2.75% dividend. The caveats are balance-sheet-based and real: D/E of 1.374, long-term debt of $26.0bn after the deal, quick ratio of 0.284 and ROIC of 5.6%. The discount is genuine but it is a leverage-and-execution discount, not a free lunch.
The market is paying about 13.7x forward adjusted EPS for a business guiding to mid-single-digit to low-double-digit EPS growth plus a 2.75% dividend - i.e., it is paying for a bond-proxy total return, not for growth, and it is explicitly not paying for the $400m JDE Peet's synergy program or for the split. That asymmetry is the setup: if Q3'26 (expected late October/early November 2026) shows coffee input costs genuinely rolling over and volumes holding, the multiple can re-rate toward the mid-to-high teens on the same $2.29 estimate with no earnings upgrade required - that re-rate is 80% of my upside case. Conversely, if you are buying for a GAAP earnings inflection you will be waiting years, because amortization from the 2018 Dr Pepper Snapple deal and now JDE Peet's keeps reported EPS far below adjusted (Q2'26: $0.044 GAAP vs $0.57 adjusted). Anchor on adjusted EPS, FCF per share, and net debt/EBITDA - never the headline P/E.
Range-bound consolidation inside an intact uptrend. As of 2026-09-13, RSI(14) stood at 47.5 - dead neutral, no overbought or oversold edge - with the stock at $31.39, which is 1.47% below its 20-day SMA (about $31.86), 0.67% above its 50-day (about $31.18) and 7.41% above its 200-day (about $29.22). After a +14.52% six-month run and +6.19% month, the last week gave back 3.68%, so this reads as a healthy pause rather than a breakdown. Against the $24.88-$33.82 52-week range, price sits in the upper-middle (range midpoint is $29.35). Entry-timing implication: there is no technical urgency in either direction; risk/reward is better accumulating in the $29.2-$31.2 zone (200-day/50-day and the range midpoint) than chasing a breakout through the $33.82 high, and a clean loss of the 200-day would be the first sign the mid-year uptrend is broken.
- Green coffee and arabica input costs - management and sell-side commentary indicate coffee costs peaked around Q1 2026; easing would be the single biggest margin tailwind for the U.S. Coffee segment in H2'26 and 2027.
- Tariffs plus agricultural and aluminum packaging costs - direct COGS exposure on coffee pods and CSD cans, and the most likely source of guidance volatility.
- Interest rates and refinancing cost - with long-term debt at $26.0bn after the JDE Peet's deal, every 25bp on the refinancing stack matters to EPS and to the multiple; a lower-rate path cuts interest expense and supports a re-rate.
- Consumer trade-down behavior - lower-income households rotating out of premium pods into cheaper coffee formats pressures volumes, partially offset by zero-sugar carbonated soft drinks and energy distribution gains.
- Defensive sector rotation - KDP's 0.414 beta makes it a haven in risk-off tape and a funding source in risk-on tape, so staples flows and rate expectations will often move the stock more than company news.
- Q3 2026 earnings (expected late October/early November 2026) - the first clean checkpoint on whether coffee cost pressure is genuinely moderating and whether JDE Peet's synergies are tracking.
- Corporate separation into a cold-beverage entity (BevCo) and Global Coffee Co., targeted for early 2027, with organizational readiness milestones due by year-end 2026 - the largest single potential re-rating catalyst via sum-of-the-parts.
- Capture of the $400m three-year JDE Peet's cost synergy program, reaffirmed at the 2026-09-10 Barclays Global Consumer Staples Conference.
- Deleveraging progress - roughly $2.0bn of TTM free cash flow applied to debt paydown; getting pro-forma leverage from north of 4x toward 3x would materially de-risk the equity story.
- The announced $925m asset-pruning divestiture ahead of the split - proceeds and any gain or loss will hit reported numbers and simplify the two pure-plays.
- Leverage and liquidity - long-term debt of $26.0bn, D/E of 1.374, current ratio of 0.479 and quick ratio of 0.284 leave limited flexibility if integration costs run hot or rates stay higher for longer.
- Sticky coffee input cost and tariff inflation could delay the margin recovery the bull case depends on, especially with pod volume already soft among value-seeking consumers.
- JDE Peet's integration and the corporate split are two large, simultaneous programs; recurring one-time costs keep GAAP EPS far below adjusted (Q2'26 $0.044 vs $0.57), and if that gap persists the adjusted number loses credibility.
- Estimate risk - the $2.292 next-FY EPS underpinning the 13.7x forward multiple likely assumes synergy delivery; a miss makes the stock look meaningfully less cheap than it does today.
- Screening distortion - the trailing 31.6x P/E, -2.72 PEG and 5.6% ROIC all flatter the bear case while the 100/100 growth score flatters the bull case; both are artifacts of one acquisition, so any single-metric screen on this name is unreliable right now.
A levered but genuinely cash-generative defensive beverage name trading at about 13.7x forward earnings and a roughly 4.6% free cash flow yield, with a dated split catalyst and a 2.75% dividend - that is a reasonable total-return holding for a patient investor, not a bargain hunter's slam dunk. The GAAP optics look alarming (Q2'26 EPS $0.044, operating margin 9.2%) and will keep looking that way for several quarters because of acquisition amortization, while pro-forma leverage above 4x and a 0.284 quick ratio leave little room for error. As of 2026-09-13, I would rather accumulate on weakness toward the high-$20s than chase at $31, and I would size it as an income/defensive position rather than a high-conviction growth bet.
Method: justified forward P/E, cross-checked with a dividend discount model. I apply 15.0x to next-FY estimated adjusted EPS of $2.292, giving $34.38 - the 15.0x sits between the current 13.7x forward multiple and the 25.9x 5-year average trailing P/E (which I discount as GAAP-distorted by amortization), and reflects mid-single-digit EPS growth, a 2.75% dividend, a 0.414 beta and $2bn of annual free cash flow, offset by pro-forma leverage above 4x and split-execution risk. A Gordon-growth cross-check on the $0.865 dividend per share at roughly 9.25% required return and roughly 6.5% growth implies about $31.50, bracketing the estimate on the downside and leaving the 15.0x multiple, not a re-rating, as the driver of upside from the $31.39 price on 2026-09-13.
The 51.1 Fair Fundamentals band is directionally defensible but built from two offsetting distortions, so I would put a contextual score closer to 60-63 (Fair shading to Good) - about 10-12 points higher, which is why I land on Partially Agree rather than Agree or Disagree. The growth leg scored 100.0, but that is an artifact the notes flag: revenue went from $3.98bn in Q1'26 to $7.31bn in Q2'26 solely because JDE Peet's consolidated, so the formula is rewarding a purchase, not organic demand - organic growth is mid-single to low-double-digit. Conversely, quality/profitability (42.8) and financial health (42.4) are penalized by trailing GAAP figures distorted by deal amortization and one-time charges (Q2'26 operating margin 9.2% vs 21.6% a year earlier; GAAP EPS $0.044 vs $0.57 adjusted), and the ratio screener (33.6) punishes a 0.479 current ratio and 0.284 quick ratio that beverage companies structurally run low or negative on working capital - the Q2'26 jump in current liabilities to $19.7bn from $10.0bn looks like debt reclassification around the close, not a liquidity crisis. Against that, the parts of the score that are not distorted are honestly weak: D/E 1.374, ROIC 5.6%, ROE 8.1%, and real leverage above 4x pro-forma, so I would not push the score much past the low-60s. On the lean: the band is Fair Fundamentals and valuation context is Neutral vs. its own history, which maps mechanically to Neutral, and I am not deviating - the pending early-2027 separation and the closed JDE Peet's deal are known, dated events already reflected in that band and in the score's own notes, not a hidden catalyst the formula cannot see.
AI-generated analysis for informational purposes only, not financial advice.