KR — The Kroger Co.
The Kroger Co. functions as a significant retail entity throughout the United States, encompassing a varied collection of store formats. Its operations include integrated food and drug stores, which stock a broad range of products from natural and organic sections to pharmacies, general merchandise, pet centers, fresh seafood, and organic produce.
Price chart & technical analysis
Loading chart…
As of 2026-09-13, Kroger traded at $58.49 (market cap $35.8B), about 8% above its 52-week low of $54.15 and 24% below its 52-week high of $76.58. The Sept 11, 2026 Q2 FY2026 report delivered a profit beat (adjusted EPS $1.09 vs ~$1.05 consensus) but came with a cut to full-year identical-sales growth guidance to 0.2-0.8% from 1-2%.
Sentiment is stuck between two facts. The bear case is visible in the tape: -22.63% over six months, -9.61% over three months, price sitting 8.42% below its 200-day moving average and only ~8% off a 52-week low. The bull case is the Sept 11, 2026 print: Q2 FY26 sales of $34.62B (+2% YoY), operating income +12% to $971M, adjusted EPS of $1.09 beating ~$1.05 consensus, e-commerce sales +20%, retail media profit +24%, and roughly $1B of stock bought back in the quarter. Investors are also digesting a guidance trim (identical sales ex-fuel cut to 0.2-0.8%), a ~140bp pharmacy sales drag from IRA reimbursement changes, soft SNAP/low-income basket trends, and a produce disruption from a cyclospora outbreak. Analyst stance is a consensus Buy/Moderate Buy with targets clustered around $69-71, but recent cuts (Citigroup to $57) show the sell side is split between 'profit resilience' and 'no top line.'
Revenue growth has quietly re-accelerated. Matched-quarter YoY went from +0.1% in the Aug-2025 quarter ($33.94B) to +0.7% (Nov-25), +1.2% (Jan-26), +2.2% (May-26, $46.12B) and +2.0% in the quarter ended 2026-08-15 ($34.62B vs $33.94B). Operating margin is expanding consistently: 2.81% in the latest quarter vs 2.54% a year earlier, and 3.05% vs 2.93% the quarter before — driven by mix (retail media +24% profit, e-commerce +20%) and cost discipline, not volume. Diluted EPS of $1.46 (Q1 FY26) and $1.05 (Q2 FY26) were up ~13% and ~15% YoY, flattered by a shrinking share count. The critical distortion is the quarter ended 2025-11-08, which posted a -$1.54B operating loss and -$2.02 EPS; that single one-off charge is what makes TTM EPS $1.79, TTM operating margin 1.4%, TTM ROIC 4.7% and the 31.3x TTM P/E look dire. The genuine structural negative is on the top line: management just cut identical sales to 0.2-0.8%, so the earnings improvement is margin/mix/buyback driven rather than volume driven — profit resilience without top-line vitality. Note also that the last quarter's free cash flow was only $1M (OCF $1.145B vs capex $1.144B), versus $462M in Q1 FY26 and $1.80B in the Jan-2026 quarter, so cash generation remains lumpy and capex-hungry.
Expensive on trailing numbers, roughly fair on the numbers that matter. As of 2026-09-13 the TTM P/E was 31.28x against a 5-year average of 21.33x — the source of the deterministic model's 'Rich vs. its own history' tag — but that 31.3x is computed on $1.79 of TTM GAAP EPS that contains a -$2.02 quarter. Measured against FY26 adjusted EPS guidance of $5.10-5.30 (midpoint $5.20), the stock trades at ~11.2x; against the analyst next-FY estimate of $5.197, ~11.3x. P/S of 0.24 is essentially at the 5-year average of 0.25. Trailing EV/EBITDA of 10.87x is impairment-distorted; normalized (roughly $7B EBITDA on an EV of about $52B) it is ~7.4x, mid-range for a grocery retailer. PEG of -0.591 is meaningless here because the trailing growth denominator is distorted. Verdict: ~11x forward for a 2.54%-yielding, buyback-heavy defensive grocer with sub-1% comps is fair, not a bargain — the low multiple is a rational discount for a growth problem, not an obvious mispricing.
At $58.49 the market is paying ~11.2x FY26 guidance and effectively assuming the 0.2-0.8% identical-sales guide is the durable run rate, with minimal credit for the retail media, e-commerce automation and cost programmes that are actually expanding profit. The mechanical bull math is real: roughly $1B of buybacks per quarter at ~11x retires about 1.7% of the float per quarter, so even flat net income produces mid-single-digit EPS growth. But the market is also rationally refusing to pay up for a retailer that cannot grow units, and the guidance trim says management sees the same thing. Practical read: if Kroger simply delivers $5.20 and holds the multiple, you get ~2.5% dividend plus mid-single-digit EPS growth; if identical sales go negative, the multiple has room to compress to 9-10x ($47-52) before value buyers get interested. That asymmetry is not favourable enough to underwrite the base case before the Oct 20, 2026 investor update.
As of 2026-09-13, RSI(14) stood at 54.43 — dead neutral, with no oversold washout to buy. The $58.49 price sat 1.71% above the 20-day SMA (~$57.51) and 1.24% above the 50-day SMA (~$57.77), but 8.42% below the 200-day SMA (~$63.87): a short-term basing bounce inside a medium-term downtrend (6-month return -22.63%, 3-month -9.61%, 1-week -0.17%). Price is ~8% above the 52-week low of $54.15 and ~24% below the high of $76.58, with a beta of 0.406. Timing implication: the 200-day at roughly $63.9 is the line in the sand. Either wait for a retest of $54-55 where risk/reward improves materially, or wait for a decisive reclaim of the 200-day to confirm an actual trend change. Buying now means buying mid-range with resistance directly overhead.
- Consumer caution and pressure on government-funded benefits (SNAP and related) are constraining basket sizes, especially for Kroger's low-to-middle-income core customer, capping organic volume across traditional grocery.
- Inflation Reduction Act pharmacy reimbursement changes are a structural, not cyclical, headwind — management quantified roughly a 140bp drag on pharmacy sales this year.
- Rate and refinancing environment matters more than usual here: $15.16B of long-term debt against $201M of cash and a 0.702 current ratio means a levered balance sheet in a higher-for-longer rate world.
- Grocery price competition from Walmart, Costco, Aldi, Amazon and dollar stores keeps gross margin (22.6% TTM) under pressure and forces continuous price investment.
- Defensive-sector rotation cuts both ways: KR's 0.406 beta makes it a haven if macro weakens, but it also structurally underperforms in risk-on rallies, limiting multiple expansion.
- October 20, 2026 Investor Update — the primary near-term catalyst, where management is expected to lay out pricing architecture, cost-reduction pipeline and structural earnings power; a credible long-term algorithm could re-rate the multiple.
- Q3 FY2026 results (expected early December 2026) — first hard evidence on whether the lowered 0.2-0.8% identical-sales guide holds and whether the IRA pharmacy drag is peaking or persisting.
- Continued aggressive repurchases (~$1B in Q2 FY26 alone) at ~11x earnings — mechanically accretive to EPS and a real floor under per-share metrics.
- Scaling of high-margin engines: retail media (Kroger Precision Marketing, +24% profit) and automated e-commerce fulfilment (+20% sales), which are the only visible margin-expansion levers.
- Execution of the new EVP of Store Operations (Walmart veteran Mark Ibbotson, appointed early September 2026) on value/pricing resets, plus progress on regional expansion including the pending Giant Eagle integration phasing into 2027.
- Identical sales growth has been cut to 0.2-0.8% and sits close to zero; if comps turn negative, the entire buyback-plus-margin EPS algorithm loses its foundation.
- Balance sheet: debt/equity of 4.132, current ratio of 0.702, quick ratio of 0.306, long-term debt of $15.16B against just $201M of cash, and stockholders' equity down from $12.9B (Nov 2024) to $5.85B (Aug 2026) — buyback-driven equity erosion raises the risk of negative equity if another impairment lands.
- Free cash flow quality: the latest quarter produced just $1M of FCF on $1.144B of capex, and the trailing four quarters total only ~$2.27B against roughly $900M of dividends plus multi-billion buybacks, meaning shareholder returns are partly balance-sheet funded.
- Return on invested capital of 4.7% is barely at or below cost of capital — Kroger is not obviously compounding intrinsic value despite reporting 'profit resilience.'
- External shocks are recurring: IRA reimbursement changes (~140bp pharmacy drag), cyclospora produce disruption, and share loss to Walmart/Costco/Aldi/Amazon in a price-competitive grocery market.
Not compelling at $58.49. Kroger is a genuinely defensive, low-beta (0.406) business with real profit-side momentum — Q2 FY26 operating income +12% to $971M, adjusted EPS $1.09 vs ~$1.05 consensus, retail media profit +24%, e-commerce sales +20% — but the top line is stalled (identical-sales guidance cut to 0.2-0.8%), ROIC of 4.7% barely clears its cost of capital, and 4.132x debt/equity with a 0.702 current ratio and $201M of cash leaves little room for error while equity has shrunk from $12.9B to $5.85B in under two years. At ~11.2x FY26 adjusted EPS the stock is cheap in absolute terms, but not cheap enough to compensate for a deteriorating comp trajectory and no visible catalyst until the Oct 20, 2026 investor update. I would want either a retest of the $54-55 area or evidence that identical sales can inflect positive before treating this as a buy.
Applied a 12.0x multiple — the midpoint of Kroger's own roughly 11-13x historical forward-EPS range, justified by sub-1% identical sales growth and a 4.7% ROIC — to forward adjusted EPS of $5.20 (midpoint of FY26 guidance of $5.10-5.30), giving $62.40, rounded to $62. Cross-check: ~7.5x normalized EV/EBITDA on roughly $7.0B of EBITDA (normalized operating income near $3.3B plus ~$3.7B D&A) less about $16B of net debt against ~613M shares implies $59-65, bracketing the same level; no terminal growth premium was added because the evidence does not support volume growth.
My independent read is that the underlying business is better than a 32/100 'Weak Fundamentals' score implies, mostly because the score is entirely trailing and the trailing window contains a single catastrophic quarter: the period ended 2025-11-08 posted -$1.54B operating income and -$2.02 EPS, which is the dominant reason TTM EPS is $1.79, TTM operating margin is 1.4%, ROIC is 4.7%, and the growth legs read as negative. Strip that one-off and the operating picture is one of modest improvement: operating margin 2.81% in Q2 FY26 vs 2.54% a year earlier, matched-quarter revenue +2.0%/+2.2% in the last two quarters, and the accruals ratio is a healthy -1.02% (cash earnings ahead of reported income), so the quality-of-earnings leg is not the problem. Two genuine weak spots the score gets right and that I would not wave away: financial health (20.6) is legitimately poor given 4.132x debt/equity, a 0.702 current ratio and a 0.306 quick ratio, and the growth leg is legitimately weak because identical sales are now guided to 0.2-0.8%. The bigger problem with the score is the valuation overlay: the 'Rich vs. its own history' label comes from a 31.28x TTM P/E against a 21.33x 5-year average, but that TTM P/E is an artifact of the impaired EPS — on FY26 adjusted guidance of $5.10-5.30 the stock is ~11.2x, and on P/S (0.24 vs a 0.25 5-year average) it is roughly at its own history, not rich. Netting it out, I would move the score up to roughly 45-48 (a 'Fair Fundamentals' band) rather than 32, which is a 13-16 point adjustment — one tier, not two — so Partially Agree. I am not invoking a deviation on overall_lean: no single dated event in the brief (the Sept 11, 2026 earnings beat is an ordinary quarterly report, not an acquisition, restatement or fraud disclosure) qualifies under the rules, so the mandated Weak + Rich mapping to Bearish stands even though I read the valuation half of that tag as misleading.
AI-generated analysis for informational purposes only, not financial advice.