NEM — Newmont Corporation

As of 2026-09-13 the tape and the sell side agree. NEM has run 26.5% in three months and more than 50% year-over-year on elevated gold, and the analyst community is solidly constructive: 28 Buy, 9 Hold, 0 Sell, with a consensus target of $136.83 and a recent-target average of $139.83 against a $126.81 spot price. The Q2 2026 print (filed 23 Jul 2026) supported the move - adjusted EPS of $2.10 beat the $2.05 consensus and free cash flow hit a record Q2 $2.2B - and management returned $1.9B in the quarter ($0.261/share dividend plus buybacks) under an expanded $6B repurchase authorization, while cutting long-term debt from $7.5B a year ago to $5.08B. The dissent is real but second-order: Q2 revenue of $6.12B missed forecasts, AISC of $1,621/oz is far above 2025's $1,358/oz full-year level, and Barclays/Bernstein trimmed targets to $124/$144 on lower volumes and higher capex. Net, the market is bullish, but positioning is no longer washed out - the shares ended 2026-09-13 only ~6% below their $135.29 52-week high.

The three-year arc is a clean, powerful recovery, not a decaying business. Revenue ran $2.49B (Q3'23) to $3.92B (Q4'23) as the Newcrest integration landed, then built from $4.00B (Q1'24) to $5.72B (Q4'24), $4.87B (Q1'25), $5.28B (Q2'25), $5.38B (Q3'25), $6.57B (Q4'25) and $7.18B (Q1'26). Operating margin genuinely inflected: 23.3% in Q1'24, 28.6% Q2'24, 27.9% Q3'24, 40.9% Q4'24, 38.3% Q1'25, 44.4% Q2'25, 45.7% Q3'25, 56.1% Q4'25 and 60.6% in Q1'26 - roughly a doubling of margin in eight quarters, driven by higher realized gold prices rather than volume (full-year guidance of 5.3M attributable oz is broadly flat). The cyclical low point is unambiguous: Q4'23 posted a $3.15B net loss and -$3.221 diluted EPS alongside negative $304M free cash flow, versus $2.20B net income and $2.06 EPS in Q2'26. Free cash flow inflected even harder: TTM FCF of $8.31B (Q3'25-Q2'26) versus $5.32B for the prior twelve months, a +56% YoY increase, with capex discipline holding quarterly spend near $640-720M except for the $2.23B Q4'25 spike. One important caveat: the FMP Q2'26 revenue line of $3.454B is inconsistent with the approximately $6.12B the company reported, and the deterministic score's own notes flag a -52% sequential revenue move as possibly a divestiture/artifact. I treat the Q2'26 revenue figure as unreliable and do not read it as a demand collapse; the record $2.2B FCF in the same quarter confirms the underlying business did not halve. Structural trend: margin expansion and cash generation intact; the only genuine negative inflection is unit cost, with FY2026 AISC guided to ~$1,680/oz versus $1,358/oz in 2025.

Fair, not cheap, on 2026-09-13. The headline numbers look undemanding: TTM P/E of 15.95x on $8.072 EPS, forward P/E of ~13.4x on FY2027 consensus EPS of $9.447, PEG of 0.376, and EV/EBITDA of 9.08x. But the optics are misleading in both directions. The 23.69x '5-year average P/E' is not a usable anchor because 2023-24 earnings were near zero after the Q4'23 impairment, mechanically inflating that average. Meanwhile P/S of 5.92x sits 70% above the 5-year average of 3.49x, P/B of 3.81x is full for a miner, and 9.08x EV/EBITDA is at the top of the typical 6-9x gold-major band. The cheap forward multiple is a function of earnings being levered to gold near cyclical highs, not of a durable earnings base - the same 13.4x would be 20x+ if gold gave back a fifth of its gains. Relative to its own history the deterministic screen labels this 'Neutral vs. its own history,' and I agree: you are paying a fair price for peak-cycle cash flows.

The market is paying 13.4x forward EPS for a company whose EPS is essentially a gold-price derivative sitting on top of a ~$1,680/oz cost base. Note the composition of the estimate: FY2027 consensus EPS of $9.447 is +17% over TTM EPS of $8.072, but that growth is expected to come from price realizations, not volume - full-year 2026 production guidance is 5.3M oz and was reaffirmed, and AISC is rising year-over-year. So this is not a 'pricing in growth that hasn't shown up yet' situation; the growth is already showing up in realized price and record FCF, and the stock has been re-rated for it. The playbook: as long as gold holds, the 15.95x trailing multiple and 6.2% TTM FCF yield ($8.31B on $133.6B) are supportable and the consensus $136.83 target is reachable. If gold rolls over, this becomes a double-compression setup - the E falls and the multiple the market is willing to pay on commodity earnings falls with it. Watch the Q3 2026 print (late Oct/early Nov 2026) specifically for whether AISC is drifting toward the $1,680/oz guided ceiling; every $50/oz of cost creep is roughly $265M of annualized EBITDA at 5.3M oz.

Momentum is strong but extended. As of 2026-09-13, RSI(14) stood at 57.46 - firm but not overbought, so there is no technical sell signal. Price of $126.81 was essentially flat versus the 20-day SMA (-0.08%, i.e. the 20-day was ~$126.9), which reads as short-term consolidation after a run. The problem is the distance to the longer averages: +15.51% above the 50-day (~$109.8) and +15.97% above the 200-day (~$109.4). A spread that wide means mean-reversion risk is elevated and the risk/reward of initiating here is poor - you are buying roughly 16% above trend support. The stock is also only ~6% below its $135.29 52-week high after a +7.61% month and a +26.52% three-month run. Entry-timing implication: either wait for a pullback toward the 50-day area in the $110s (a 12-14% drawdown that would still leave the uptrend intact) or wait for a decisive breakout above $135.29 to confirm the next leg. Buying the middle of a stretched range is the worst of the three options.

• Gold price and real rates: expectations of a lower rate trajectory weaken the dollar and cut the opportunity cost of holding non-yielding bullion - the single dominant driver of NEM's realized price and margin, since AISC is ~$1,680/oz.
• Sector-wide cost inflation: higher production taxes, royalties, and deferred sustaining capital have pushed FY2026 AISC guidance to ~$1,680/oz from $1,358/oz in 2025, meaning gold must keep rising just to hold margins flat.
• Central bank and geopolitical gold demand: sustained official-sector buying provides a structural bid under bullion that is less rate-sensitive than ETF flows, which supports the durability of current price levels.
• Mine sequencing and grade decline at Peñasquito and Cadia: a company-specific but sector-typical macro of falling head grades that forces higher throughput and capex to hold volume, pressuring FCF conversion.
• Non-USD cost base and jurisdiction exposure (Australia, Canada, Ghana, Peru, Papua New Guinea, Africa): currency moves and shifting mining tax/royalty regimes in host countries directly hit margins and permit timelines.

• Q3 2026 results (expected late Oct / early Nov 2026): the key test of whether cost discipline is offsetting lower grades at Peñasquito and Cadia and whether the company stays on track for 5.3M attributable oz.
• Ahafo North ramp-up to commercial production in Ghana: the primary identified volume offset to declining grades elsewhere, and a genuine 2027 production/unit-cost swing factor.
• Continued capital returns under the expanded $6B buyback authorization plus quarterly dividends (currently $0.261/share, a 0.79% yield) - buybacks at these levels shrink the share count into a high-FCF period.
• Execution of the August 2026 agreement with Barrick regarding the Nevada Gold Mines joint venture, plus any further portfolio divestitures that simplify the asset base or reduce debt.
• The path of US rate cuts and the dollar through late 2026/2027 - each leg lower in real rates is direct earnings leverage for a producer with ~5.3M oz of annual price-exposed output.

• Gold price reversal: earnings and multiple both levered to bullion. A $400-500/oz decline would strip roughly $2.1-2.7B of annualized revenue at 5.3M oz, compress the forward P/E from 13.4x toward 18-20x, and expose how much of the trailing $8.31B FCF is cycle, not franchise.
• Cost escalation outpacing the gold tailwind: FY2026 AISC guided to ~$1,680/oz versus $1,358/oz in 2025 is a ~24% unit-cost increase, driven by royalties, taxes, and deferred sustaining capital. If grades keep declining while gold plateaus, margins compress from both ends.
• Operational and jurisdictional concentration: large assets in Ghana, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Australia, and Africa carry permitting, community, tailings, and political-risk exposure that can halt production exogenously to the gold price.
• Disclosure/data integrity on the reported quarter: FMP's Q2 2026 revenue of $3.454B conflicts with the company-reported $6.12B, and the score's own notes flag a -52% sequential revenue move as possibly a divestiture or artifact. Until that reconciles, the reported growth trend carries real uncertainty.
• Capital allocation at a cyclical high: deploying a $6B repurchase authorization while gold sits near record levels risks buying back stock at peak-cycle valuations, which would permanently impair per-share value if the metal mean-reverts.
• Reserve depletion and reserve-replacement cost: producing 5.3M oz a year without equivalent reserve additions converts a strong balance sheet into a shrinking asset base over a decade.

Not a buy at $126.81 as of 2026-09-13, but a legitimate hold. Newmont is a genuinely well-run, delevered business - debt/equity of 0.154, $9.0B of cash, long-term debt down from $7.5B to $5.08B in a year, 20.9% ROE, 12.2% ROIC, 51% operating margin, and $8.31B of trailing FCF - and 13.4x forward earnings is not an expensive price for that quality. The problem is what you are being paid for: roughly 6% upside to my ~$134 fair value, in exchange for taking the full downside of a gold price sitting at cyclical highs while AISC climbs 24% year-over-year and the stock trades 16% above its 200-day moving average. Everything good about this company is already in the price. I would rather own it after a pullback into the $110s (the 50-day area) or after a decisive break above $135.29, not in the middle of a stretched range.

I applied a 14.2x multiple to FY2027 consensus EPS of $9.447 from the FMP analyst feed, giving $134.15. The 14.2x is deliberate: a modest premium to the ~10-15x band typical of large gold producers, justified by Newmont's scale, 0.154 debt/equity, $9.0B cash balance, and $6B buyback authorization, but well below the 23.69x '5-year average P/E,' which is unusable because 2023-24 earnings were near zero after the Q4'23 impairment. I also refuse to pay a premium multiple on earnings that are levered to gold near record levels. Cross-check: trailing twelve-month free cash flow of $8.31B discounted at a 6.0-6.5% required yield implies roughly $122-132 per share, bracketing the same low-$130s range. My $134.15 sits about 6% above the 2026-09-13 price of $126.81 and modestly below the $136.83 analyst consensus target.