ORLY — O'Reilly Automotive, Inc.
O'Reilly Automotive, Inc., along with its subsidiary companies, functions as a leading retail and wholesale provider of automotive aftermarket products, specialized tools, supplies, and accessories across the United States. The company's comprehensive inventory includes both new and reconditioned vehicle hard parts and essential maintenance items.
Price chart & technical analysis
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As of 2026-09-13, ORLY traded at $85.82 (market cap ~$71.1B), roughly 21% below its 52-week high of $108.72 and only ~4% above its 52-week low of $82.59. The Q2 2026 report (2026-07-29) beat and management raised FY26 guidance to $18.9–19.2B revenue and $3.20–3.30 EPS, yet the stock has kept sliding on sector sentiment.
The tape is negative even though the news isn't. As of 2026-09-13 the shares were -2.36% over 1 week, -6.77% over 1 month, -5.71% over 3 months and -6.25% over 6 months, with RSI at 38.92 and price below all three moving averages. The driver is sector contagion — cautious DIY commentary and soft results at Advance Auto Parts have de-rated the whole aftermarket retail group — not company-specific deterioration (Q2'26 revenue +8.1% YoY to $4.892B, comps +6.0%, EPS +10%). Sell-side disagrees with the tape: the FMP breakdown shows 28 Buy / 18 Hold / 1 Sell, with 8 recent price targets averaging $107.30 — roughly 25% above the 2026-09-13 price.
Revenue growth has genuinely re-accelerated, not decelerated. YoY revenue growth ran +3.8% (Q3'24), +6.9% (Q4'24), +4.0% (Q1'25), +5.9% (Q2'25), +7.8% (Q3'25), +7.8% (Q4'25), +10.2% (Q1'26) and +8.1% in Q2'26 (revenue $4.892B vs $4.525B). Operating margin has held in a 17.9%–21.4% band with normal Q1 seasonality and has drifted modestly higher YoY: 18.45% in Q1'26 vs 17.92% a year earlier (+53bps), 18.77% in Q4'25 vs 18.04% (+73bps), and roughly flat in Q2'26 at 20.15% vs 20.21%. Net income rose +10.4% YoY in Q1'26 and +14.8% in Q2'26 ($715.1M). TTM free cash flow is $2.156B versus $1.772B a year earlier (+22%), and the accruals ratio of -1.68% means cash earnings are running ahead of reported earnings — a real quality positive, not an accounting mirage. The only genuine distortion is on the balance sheet, not the income statement: stockholders' equity swung -40% between 2025-12-31 and 2026-03-31 ($-763M to $-1.067B), but that is buyback activity (long-term debt also rose to $7.01B from $5.91B a year earlier), not the divestiture/spinoff the score's note speculates about.
Fair, not cheap and not expensive. As of 2026-09-13: TTM P/E 27.07x versus a 5-year average of 25.79x (~5% premium); forward P/E of ~26.1x on the FY26 consensus/guided EPS of $3.287; P/S 3.83 versus a 5-year average of 3.79 (essentially in line); PEG 2.05; EV/EBITDA ~19.9x on ~$3.9B TTM EBITDA, also a premium to the market. The fall from $108.72 to $85.82 has compressed the multiple back to roughly its own historical norm, but it has not created a discount — you are still paying a full ~26x forward for ~8% revenue growth and ~10–11% EPS growth. That is defensible for a 0.515-beta, defensive compounder earning 33.1% ROIC, but it is not a bargain and it embeds no margin of safety for a comps miss.
This de-rating is sentiment-led, not estimate-led. FY26 EPS of $3.287 sits in the upper half of management's raised $3.20–$3.30 guidance, so consensus already reflects the beat-and-raise — the stock is not pricing in growth that hasn't shown up. At ~26x forward, the market is pricing continued ~5–6% comps and a stable ~20% operating margin. The asymmetry is sharp: hold comps at 5–6% with flat-to-up margins and the multiple can drift back toward 28x, which is roughly $92–95 (near my fair value, well below the $107 sell-side target); let Q3 comps slip below ~4% with SG&A/wage pressure and 26x looks full, putting the $82.59 52-week low back in play. The late-October Q3 print is the estimate-revision trigger — that, not the multiple, is what re-rates this name.
Clean downtrend, no bottom signal yet. As of 2026-09-13: RSI(14) 38.92 — weak but not yet oversold (<30); price 3.06% below the 20-day SMA (~$88.53), 3.12% below the 50-day (~$88.58) and 6.62% below the 200-day (~$91.90); returns of -2.36% (1wk), -6.77% (1mo), -5.71% (3mo) and -6.25% (6mo); sitting just above the 52-week low of $82.59. Entry-timing implication: there is no bullish divergence and no trend break, so patience is the only edge — either a flush toward RSI <30 / the $82–83 support zone, or a reclaim of the 50-day around $88.60, would be the first defensible add points.
- Average U.S. light-vehicle age at a record ~12.8 years — a structural, largely non-discretionary tailwind: older cars need more parts and more repairs regardless of the economic cycle.
- DIY consumer pressure from inflation and tighter household budgets — the soft half of the mix, currently offset by the Pro/commercial segment that drove the +6.0% Q2'26 comp.
- Sector contagion from Advance Auto Parts' weak results and cautious commentary, compressing aftermarket retail multiples regardless of company-specific execution.
- Cost inflation in SG&A per store, wages and imported-part tariffs — the main swing factor for the ~20% operating margin, offset so far by pricing realization and store-density scaling.
- Higher-for-longer rates against a buyback-funded balance sheet: long-term debt rose 18.6% YoY to $7.01B while stockholders' equity is -$1.84B, raising refinancing cost and reducing the accretion of further debt-funded repurchases.
- Q3 2026 earnings in late October 2026 — the key test of whether the +6.0% Q2 comp and Pro momentum persist and whether FY26 margin targets remain intact.
- Continued buybacks against a cumulative authorization pool near $31.75B, which mechanically supports per-share EPS growth even with flat net income growth.
- Any normalization in aftermarket sector sentiment (i.e., Advance Auto Parts stabilizing) that allows ORLY's relative outperformance to re-rate the multiple toward 28x.
- Pro/commercial share gains and new-store density as the DIY retail tier stays soft.
- Valuation/multiple risk: ~26x forward EPS for ~10% growth offers no cushion; a comps slowdown to low single digits could push the stock below the $82.59 52-week low despite intact earnings.
- Balance sheet: negative stockholders' equity (-$1.84B at 2026-06-30), current ratio 0.752, quick ratio 0.128, and long-term debt up 18.6% YoY to $7.01B — the structure only works while cash flow holds.
- DIY weakness deepening if consumer discretionary pressure persists, leaving the Pro segment to carry all the growth.
- Cost inflation (wages, SG&A per store, tariffs) compressing the ~20% operating margin and the 51.6% gross margin.
- Competitive intensity in DIY from AutoZone, Advance Auto Parts and e-commerce, plus sector-wide read-across volatility that repeatedly re-rates the whole group.
- EPS quality: net income growth of ~10–15% is real, but per-share growth is flattered by a shrinking share count; if buybacks slow, reported EPS growth decelerates.
This is a good business in a soft tape, not a broken one: +6.0% comps, a 20.2% operating margin, 33.1% ROIC, $2.16B TTM free cash flow and a raised FY26 guide — the selloff is sector sentiment, not deterioration. But at a 2026-09-13 price of $85.82 against my calculated fair value of ~$93, the upside is only ~8%, and the sell-side's $107 target looks too generous. Decent risk/reward, not compelling: I would want either a lower entry (high-$70s) or evidence from the late-October Q3 print that the ~6% comp holds before calling this a high-conviction buy.
I applied a justified forward P/E of 26.5x — a modest premium to ORLY's own 5-year average TTM P/E of 25.79x, warranted by a 0.515 beta, 33.1% ROIC, ~20% operating margins and non-discretionary, fleet-age-driven demand — to a next-twelve-month EPS estimate of ~$3.50 (FY26E $3.287 grown ~11% into H1 2027, consistent with the +10% Q2'26 EPS growth), giving ~$92.75, rounded to $93.00. Cross-check: ~20x EV/EBITDA on FY26E EBITDA of ~$4.1B nets to roughly $92 of equity value per share, confirming the figure and leaving it deliberately well below the $107.30 sell-side consensus.
My independent read is that this is a Fair-to-Good business, not a Weak one, so I would move the score up roughly 18–20 points to ~62–65. The 44.2 is dragged down by the ratio screener (28.2), whose inputs are structurally invalid for ORLY: P/B, D/E and LT D/E are all null because stockholders' equity is negative (-$1.84B, a buyback artifact, not distress), quick ratio 0.128 and current ratio 0.752 are normal for a retailer running negative working capital, and P/C of 271x is meaningless. Remove that half of the blend and the formula's own fundamentals-only score of 60.2 becomes the read — and with 33.1% ROIC, a 19.6% operating margin and a -1.68% accruals ratio I would nudge quality higher still. The score's note about the -40% equity swing being a possible divestiture or spinoff is also a misread; it is buybacks. I flag that overall_lean here is the mandated mechanical mapping of the given 'Weak Fundamentals' band against a 'Neutral vs. its own history' valuation label (which yields Bearish); no dated one-off event (M&A, restatement, fraud) justifies deviating from that table, but a reader should know the lean understates the fundamental case rather than reflecting it.
AI-generated analysis for informational purposes only, not financial advice.