SHW — The Sherwin-Williams Company
The Sherwin-Williams Company engages in the development, manufacture, distribution, and sale of paint, coatings, and related products to professional, industrial, commercial and retail customers. The company operates through three segments: Paint Stores Group, Consumer Brands Group, and Performance Coatings Group.
Price chart & technical analysis
Loading chart…
As of 2026-09-13, Sherwin-Williams traded at $323.31 (+1.85% on the day), with an RSI(14) of 37.89 and a price sitting below all three major moving averages (-4.78% vs SMA20, -5.24% vs SMA50, -3.20% vs SMA200) even after a Q2 2026 beat-and-raise and upgraded FY2026 adjusted EPS guidance of $11.80-$12.20. This looks like a quality compounder in a valuation- and macro-driven de-rating, not a broken business.
There is a real split. Fundamental sentiment is constructive: sell-side consensus is Buy with an average target of ~$391 and 22 Buy vs. 15 Hold and 1 Sell, and Q2 2026 (reported 2026-07-28) delivered a double beat - revenue +7.5% YoY to $6.79B and adjusted EPS of $3.70 vs. $3.52 consensus - with FY2026 adjusted EPS guidance raised to $11.80-$12.20. Yet the tape disagrees: as of 2026-09-13 the stock was -10.24% over one month and -3.12% over one week, stuck below its SMA20, SMA50 and SMA200. KeyBanc's cautious initiation (Sector Weight, $365, citing a ~29x P/E and a sluggish housing market) captures the bear case, while Goldman ($420) and DA Davidson ($400) capture the bull case. The market is effectively saying 'good company, but price-led growth into a soft housing market at ~27x forward is not enough.'
The last three years show a clear, genuine inflection - not a blip. Revenue YoY went from roughly +0.7% (Q2 2025: $6,314.5M vs. $6,271.5M), +3.2% (Q3 2025), +5.6% (Q4 2025), +6.8% (Q1 2026) to +7.5% (Q2 2026: $6,789.3M). EPS diluted is accelerating on the same curve: +5.3% in Q3 2025 ($3.35), +1.1% in Q4 2025 ($1.92), +7.5% in Q1 2026 ($2.15), then +14.3% in Q2 2026 ($3.43 vs. $3.00). Operating margin has been stable-to-improving: 18.44% in Q3 2025, 13.92% in Q4 2025, 14.31% in Q1 2026, 18.13% in Q2 2026 versus 17.41% in Q2 2025 - a ~72bp YoY expansion, though still below the 19.64% Q2 2024 peak. The important caveat: this is almost entirely price, not volume. Gross margin is holding near 49%, but the revenue acceleration tracks the pricing actions management keeps pushing through, which is why the 2026-09-01 8% Paint Stores Group increase matters so much.
Mixed, leaning fair-to-slightly-rich on absolute terms. As of 2026-09-13, at $323.31, the TTM P/E was 29.53x versus a 5-year average of 35.26x - roughly a 16% discount to its own history - and P/S of 3.215x vs. a 5-year average of 3.60x, about 11% cheap to itself. On forward numbers the picture tightens: $323.31 / $12.00 (FY2026 adjusted guidance midpoint) = ~26.9x, and ~24.7x on the ~$13.10 I'd model for FY2027. PEG on trailing numbers is 4.02, EV/EBITDA is 21.0x, and P/B of 20.5x is meaningless given buyback-depleted equity ($3.86B). Verdict: not expensive versus its own history, but a full multiple versus the S&P for a company growing earnings high-single-digits with flat volumes.
There is a real disconnect as of 2026-09-13: the stock fell 10.24% over the prior month while Q2 2026 beat on both lines and FY2026 guidance was raised to $11.80-$12.20. That means the market is not pricing the reported earnings - it is pricing a scenario where price-led growth stalls against a frozen housing market and the multiple compresses from ~27x forward toward the low 20s. Read it this way: if volumes stay flat but the 8% September 1 price increase sticks and raw materials cooperate, EPS of $12+ at 28-30x gets you $340-$360, and the current $323 is a modest discount to that. If a competitor or private label uses the price gap to take share, the multiple and the estimate both come down, and $323 is not a floor. The Q3 print (~2026-10-27) and the 2026-09-24 investor day are the two datapoints that resolve which scenario is live.
Weak short-term, intact long-term. As of 2026-09-13, RSI(14) was 37.89 - approaching but not at oversold - with the price 4.78% below the SMA20 (~$339.5), 5.24% below the SMA50 (~$341.2) and 3.20% below the SMA200 (~$334.0). Notably the SMA200 sits below both shorter averages, so the intermediate trend has rolled over while the longer trend is only mildly broken. The stock is 14.4% off its 52-week high of $377.77 and 11.5% above the 52-week low of $289.86. The +1.85% on 2026-09-13 looks like a first bounce attempt. Entry implication: this is a scale-in zone, not a catch-the-bottom zone - I'd want either RSI down to ~30 with the stock near $300-310, or a reclaim of the SMA50 (~$341) on volume to confirm the pullback is over. Buying here means accepting further downside toward $290.
- US housing/remodeling softness: high mortgage rates have frozen existing-home turnover, the primary driver of repaint volume - this is the single biggest swing factor for the Paint Stores Group.
- Interest rate path: a Fed cutting cycle would be the largest positive catalyst, unlocking housing turnover and turning today's price-led growth into volume-plus-price growth.
- Raw material and supply chain cost inflation: titanium dioxide, resins and solvents, amplified by Middle East geopolitical friction, are being offset by the 2026-09-01 8% price increase - the offset is the whole margin story.
- Non-residential, infrastructure and data-center construction: a genuine tailwind for the Performance Coatings Group that partially buffers the weak DIY/residential channel.
- Consumer Brands channel dynamics and retailer concentration: mass-retail private label and Home Depot/Lowe's bargaining power pressure that segment's margins independently of the housing cycle.
- 2026-09-24 Financial Community Presentation in Cleveland: long-term strategy, segment targets and capital allocation update - a potential multiple-reset event either direction.
- Q3 2026 earnings, expected ~2026-10-27: the first hard read on whether the 2026-09-01 8% Paint Stores Group price increase held without measurable volume/share loss heading into the winter slowdown.
- A Fed rate-cut cycle triggering a US housing turnover recovery, which would convert SHW's price-led growth into volume-led growth and likely re-rate the multiple.
- Continued balance-sheet repair and capital return: long-term debt fell ~$1.0B sequentially to $8.33B in Q2 2026, and equity fell from $4.43B to $3.86B despite $843.6M of net income, implying roughly $1.2B of buybacks in the quarter - both are direct EPS tailwinds.
- Volume stagnation: essentially all of the recent revenue acceleration is price. If the September 2026 8% increase triggers share loss to PPG, Behr or private label, the earnings algorithm breaks.
- Balance sheet leverage and liquidity: $8.33B of long-term debt against only $3.86B of equity (2.16x LT debt/equity; 3.69x total debt/equity), just $293.5M of cash, a current ratio of 0.727 and a quick ratio of 0.464. Note current liabilities jumped from $7.53B in Q1 2026 to $9.63B in Q2 2026 while LT debt fell ~$1.0B - consistent with debt reclassified to short-term, a refinancing item worth watching if rates stay high.
- Valuation risk: 21.0x EV/EBITDA and ~26.9x forward adjusted EPS leave little cushion. A single guidance miss or a housing-market re-acceleration in weakness could compress the multiple toward the low 20s, which alone is a $250-270 stock.
- Raw material cost shock or a geopolitical supply disruption that outpaces the company's ability to keep raising price.
- Lead-paint and VOC regulatory/legal exposure, plus a persistently depressed DIY channel if high rates persist into 2027.
Sherwin-Williams is a genuinely high-quality franchise - 49.1% gross margin, 16.4% operating margin, 13.9% ROIC, $3.21B of TTM free cash flow (a 4.1% FCF yield at $323.31), a negative -1.87% accruals ratio confirming earnings are backed by cash, and a 26.7% dividend payout leaving room for both buybacks and continued dividend growth. Growth is visibly inflecting (revenue +0.7% to +7.5% YoY over five quarters, Q2 2026 EPS +14.3%), debt is being paid down, and roughly $1.2B of stock was retired last quarter. But it is price-led growth into a soft housing market, the balance sheet is leveraged with a 0.73 current ratio, and at ~27x forward earnings there is no valuation cushion. As of 2026-09-13, at $323.31 with RSI 37.89 and the stock below all key moving averages, this is a reasonable accumulation zone for a patient multi-year holder, not a bargain-hunter's entry. I would scale in rather than buy the full position here.
Blended forward P/E: I applied a 27.0x multiple to a blended 12-month forward adjusted EPS of ~$12.55 (the midpoint of management's FY2026 adjusted guidance of $11.80-$12.20, and a ~9% step-up to ~$13.10 in FY2027E), giving ~$339. That multiple deliberately sits well below SHW's 5-year average TTM P/E of 35.26x - a ZIRP-era figure inflated by the 2020-21 coatings boom - while still carrying a quality premium for a ~49%-gross-margin, wide-moat franchise with $3.21B of TTM FCF and a negative accruals ratio. Cross-checked against a simplified DCF on those TTM free cash flows ($3.21B, ~$13.24/share) at 7% growth for five years, a 3.5% terminal rate and an 8.5% WACC, which returns ~$319; easing the discount rate to 8.0% returns ~$355. Blending the forward-multiple and DCF results centers the fair value at $343, implying ~6% upside from the 2026-09-13 price of $323.31 and roughly 12% downside to the analyst consensus of ~$391.
I'd push the score up roughly 12-15 points, from 42.5 into the mid-to-high 50s (Fair, not Weak). The drag is concentrated in the ratio screener (32.8) and financial health (36.2), which punish a 0.727 current ratio and a 0.464 quick ratio - but those are structural for SHW, a distributor that deliberately runs lean working capital funded by supplier payables, not a distress signal. Likewise P/B of 20.7x and D/E of 3.69x are artifacts of decades of buybacks that have shrunk book equity to $3.86B, which is exactly the distortion the ROIC-not-ROE design in the quality leg was built to avoid - yet P/B and D/E still leak into the 50%-weighted ratio screener with no such adjustment. On the merits the business scores better than 42.5: operating margin 16.4% and expanding (18.13% in Q2 2026 vs. 17.41% a year earlier), ROIC 13.9%, revenue growth accelerating from +0.7% to +7.5% YoY, and a -1.87% accruals ratio indicating conservative, cash-backed earnings. This is also a cyclical name near a housing trough rather than a structurally deteriorating one, which is precisely the case the backward-looking formula cannot see. It does not deserve 'Weak Fundamentals' - but it also isn't cheap enough to call Strong, hence Partially Agree rather than Agree. Note that I am not deviating from the mandated overall_lean mapping: there is no single dated, material event in the brief (no announced acquisition, bankruptcy, restatement or fraud disclosure) that would justify overriding the Fixed table, so Weak Fundamentals + 'Cheap vs. its own history' maps to Cautiously Bearish even though my own read of the business is more constructive than that band implies.
AI-generated analysis for informational purposes only, not financial advice.