TDG — TransDigm Group Incorporated
TransDigm Group Incorporated is a global aerospace enterprise specializing in the development, manufacturing, and distribution of a wide array of aircraft components. Operating across the United States and internationally, its business is structured around three distinct divisions.
Price chart & technical analysis
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As of 2026-09-13, TDG trades at $1,140.32 — roughly 1.9% above its 52-week low of $1,119.62 and about 22% below its 52-week high of $1,463.03 — with RSI(14) at 35.68 and the shares below their 20-, 50- and 200-day moving averages (-3.5%, -7.1%, -9.9% respectively). The disconnect: fiscal Q3 2026 (reported 2026-08-04) revenue rose 22.5% YoY to $2.74B and full-year guidance was raised, yet the stock is down 9.2% over three months and 6.1% over six.
As of 2026-09-13 the market's mood is bearish on price even though the operating news flow is bullish. TDG beat in fiscal Q3 2026 (sales +22.5% YoY to $2.74B; adjusted EPS +13.2% to $10.87) and raised FY26 guidance to $10.47–$10.55B of sales and $40.62–$41.46 of adjusted EPS — and the stock still fell 7.7% in the month after and 9.2% over three months. What is weighing on it: long-term debt climbed to $32.62B at 2026-06-27 from $24.27B a year earlier to fund roughly $2.2B of acquisitions (Jet Parts Engineering, Victor Sierra) plus the $1.07B Prince & Izant deal announced 2026-07-27; stockholders' equity sank to -$12.16B; notable insider sales by the Executive Chairman and COO were filed through mid-August; and Stifel/Morgan Stanley moved to Hold after the prior run-up. Analyst stance is genuinely mixed — the FMP breakdown shows 20 Buys vs 19 Holds and zero Sells, with an average target near $1,487.5 — but the tape is voting with leverage concerns and sector rotation, not with the earnings beats.
Revenue is clearly ACCELERATING, not decelerating. YoY growth by quarter ran +12.1% (Dec-2024), +12.0% (Mar-2025), +9.3% (Jun-2025), +11.5% (Sep-2025), then +13.9% (Dec-2025), +18.3% (Mar-2026) and +22.5% (Jun-2026) — the last three prints are a step-change, helped by M&A but described by management as double-digit growth across commercial OEM, commercial aftermarket and defense. Gross margin is remarkably stable at ~59% (59.4% in Jun-2026 vs 59.5% a year earlier), so the revenue acceleration is not being bought with price. The catch is below the revenue line: GAAP operating margin has slipped from a 48.6% peak in Sep-2025 to 46.7% (Mar-2026) and 44.8% (Jun-2026) as acquired-intangible amortization and SG&A scale with the deal program, and net income growth (+9.6% YoY in Jun-2026) badly lags revenue growth, squeezed by interest expense that now runs roughly $1.78B a year on the bigger debt stack. Trailing-twelve-month free cash flow was essentially flat at $1.93B versus $1.91B a year earlier despite 20%+ revenue growth — a working-capital and interest drag, not a demand problem. Note the FMP quarterly EPS series is internally noisy (Q1 FY26 EPS of $6.62 on $445M of net income implies ~67M shares vs ~57M in adjacent quarters), so read net income and adjusted EPS, not the raw quarterly EPS line. Bottom line: this is a genuine demand-led reacceleration with mild margin normalization and heavy interest/amortization drag, not a structural deterioration.
Fair-to-modestly-cheap versus its own history, but not cheap in absolute terms (all figures as of 2026-09-13). At $1,140.32 the stock carries a 34.6x trailing P/E on $36.77 of TTM EPS versus a 46.86x five-year average — a ~26% discount — and 6.37x TTM sales versus a 7.93x five-year average, a ~20% discount, which is why the deterministic model labels it 'Cheap vs. its own history.' On guidance, FY26 adjusted EPS of $40.62–$41.46 puts the forward P/E at roughly 27.5–28.1x, and rolling FY27E EPS of ~$46.4 forward gives ~24.6x. EV/EBITDA of 19.4x is the least flattering lens (about $93.6B EV on ~$4.82B of EBITDA), and the 3.67x PEG looks expensive — but PEG is distorted here because GAAP EPS growth is being deliberately suppressed by $32.6B of debt and deal amortization rather than by any weakening of the underlying franchise (59.6% gross margin, 46.2% operating margin, 15.2% ROIC). P/B and debt/equity are meaningless (negative $12.16B equity). Verdict: you are paying a fair forward multiple for a wide-moat, sole-source aftermarket business, with a real but leverage-driven discount to its own history. Ignore the 12.6% 'dividend yield' — that is a lumpy special-dividend/buyback artifact, not recurring income.
This is a classic estimates-up, multiple-down setup. Guidance went up on 2026-08-04 and the stock went down — meaning the de-rating is multiple compression (rate/leverage/sector rotation), not estimate cuts. As of 2026-09-13 the market is paying 27.8x guided FY26 adjusted EPS and ~24.6x my FY27E for a business compounding revenue at 20%+. Two readings: the bull read is that investors are over-discounting a balance-sheet issue that lower rates or a pause in M&A would fix; the bear read is that the market is correctly haircutting acquisition-driven revenue growth that converts into only ~10% net income growth and flat free cash flow. The tie-breaker is the November 2026 FY27 guide: if adjusted EPS growth lands at or above the recent ~13% pace, 27.8x will look too low and the multiple should re-rate; if FY27 EPS growth fades to mid-single digits on interest and amortization, the current multiple is deserved. Do not assume the Street's $1,487.5 average target is the anchor — that implies ~32x forward earnings, and there is no current evidence the market will pay that again soon.
Unambiguously downtrending as of 2026-09-13. RSI(14) at 35.68 is weak but NOT oversold (no sub-30 washout), and price sits 3.54% below the 20-day SMA, 7.06% below the 50-day and 9.87% below the 200-day — a stacked-bearish configuration. The 52-week range of $1,119.62–$1,463.03 puts the stock within ~2% of its low, and the returns are negative across every window (-1.87% 1wk, -7.7% 1mo, -9.21% 3mo, -6.12% 6mo). Entry implication: there is no technical evidence a bottom is in. Momentum traders should wait for a reclaim of the 50-day (around $1,227) or at minimum a higher low. Longer-horizon buyers get a rare chance to accumulate a quality name near its 52-week floor, but should scale in rather than buy in one clip, and treat a decisive break below ~$1,120 as a signal that something more than sentiment is wrong.
- Interest rates and refinancing cost — an unusual macro sensitivity for an industrial: $32.62B of long-term debt (up from $24.27B a year earlier) and roughly $1.78B of annual interest means every 100bp on refinanced paper is a direct hit to EPS, and it is the main reason net income grew only ~10% while revenue grew 22.5% in fiscal Q3 2026.
- Commercial aerospace cycle health — global flight hours, aging fleets and Boeing/Airbus build-rate recovery drive the high-margin aftermarket and OEM volumes; this is the single biggest swing factor for revenue, and it is currently a tailwind, not a headwind.
- Defense budget and legislative scrutiny of sole-source pricing — ongoing Congressional and DoD attention to contractor pricing transparency and sole-source margins is a persistent, low-grade regulatory overhang rather than an acute threat.
- Sector rotation and rate-driven multiple compression across aerospace/defense and industrials — TDG has lagged the ITA ETF year-to-date despite beating numbers, evidence that the de-rating is partly a group-level, rates-driven phenomenon rather than company-specific.
- Credit markets and M&A financing conditions — TransDigm's compounding model depends on debt-funded bolt-ons; wider spreads or tighter credit raise the hurdle rate on the next deal and slow the equity story.
- Fiscal Q4 and full-year 2026 earnings in November 2026, including initial FY27 guidance — the single most important event. Watch whether adjusted EPS growth holds near the recent ~13% pace and whether management signals leverage stabilization.
- Closing and integration of the $1.07B Prince & Izant acquisition (announced 2026-07-27), plus the pacing and size of the next bolt-on — a continuous source of upside surprise in this model, but also of further balance-sheet strain.
- Continued commercial aftermarket strength from elevated flight hours and an aging fleet, plus aerospace OEM rate increases, which flow disproportionately to margin.
- Any easing of rates or successful refinancing that lowers the ~$1.78B annual interest bill — a direct EPS tailwind with no operational dependency.
- Additional capital returns (special dividends or buybacks) funded with new debt, and any clarity on defense pricing scrutiny.
- Leverage and the absence of an equity cushion: $32.62B of long-term debt, roughly 6.2x net debt/EBITDA, ~$1.78B of annual interest, and negative $12.16B of stockholders' equity mean an earnings or rate shock transmits to equity with no book-value buffer.
- Growth quality: revenue +22.5% YoY in fiscal Q3 2026 converted into only +9.6% net income growth and roughly flat TTM free cash flow ($1.93B vs $1.91B a year earlier) — the incremental revenue is acquisition-heavy and carries amortization and interest costs.
- Valuation still full in absolute terms (34.6x trailing P/E, 19.4x EV/EBITDA, 3.67x PEG); a growth disappointment would leave little multiple support even after the recent de-rating.
- Sole-source pricing, regulatory and reputational risk from DoD pricing scrutiny — low probability of near-term damage, but high impact if it changes customer behavior or invites legislation.
- Insider selling by the Executive Chairman and COO filed through mid-August 2026 — not proof of anything, but an unhelpful signal near a 52-week low.
- Cyclical aerospace exposure: an airline downturn or OEM rate cut hits the high-margin aftermarket first, which is precisely where the earnings quality lives, and the $32.6B debt stack would amplify the drawdown.
TDG is a genuinely high-quality, wide-moat business — 59.6% gross margin, 46.2% operating margin, 15.2% ROIC, and a clean accruals ratio of -0.77% that says reported earnings are backed by cash — and as of 2026-09-13 the stock trades ~26% below its own five-year average P/E while estimates keep going up. That combination usually pays. The honest caveat is that this is a levered capital structure story, not a broken one: $32.62B of debt and ~6.2x net leverage mean revenue growth of 22.5% only became ~10% net income growth last quarter, and free cash flow has been flat for a year. At $1,140 (27.8x guided FY26 EPS, ~24.6x my FY27E) you are paying a fair, not bargain, price for a great asset with a big mortgage, and the chart gives no sign the selling is finished. I would lean constructive and accumulate in tranches near the 52-week floor, but the real confirmation has to come from November 2026's FY27 guidance. This is analysis, not personalized financial advice.
I applied a 30x multiple to my FY27E adjusted EPS of ~$46.40 (FY26 guidance midpoint of $41.04 grown ~13%, matching the 13.2% adjusted EPS growth reported in fiscal Q3 2026), giving $1,392, then blended that 60/40 with an 18.5x EV/EBITDA cross-check (FY27E EBITDA ~$5.4B → ~$99.9B EV, less ~$31B of post-deal net debt, over 55.9M shares = ~$1,233). The 30x is a deliberate discount to TDG's 46.9x five-year average P/E and to the Street's implied ~32x, reflecting ~6.2x net leverage; the resulting ~$1,330 sits ~17% above the 2026-09-13 price of $1,140.32 but well below the $1,487.5 consensus target.
The 70.4 / 'Good Fundamentals' band is a fair read and I would land within a few points of it in either direction — so Agree, not a rubber stamp. Two offsets: the growth leg (65.3) actually understates what the last three quarters show, with YoY revenue growth accelerating from 11.5% (Sep-2025) to 13.9% → 18.3% → 22.5% (Jun-2026); but the financial-health leg (88.9) is too generous, because it is propped up by a 3.09 current ratio and positive FCF while the screener had to drop debt/equity and P/B entirely (equity is -$12.16B) and TDG in reality carries $32.62B of long-term debt at ~6.2x net debt/EBITDA. Netting those two, I would shade the score a few points lower at most, which keeps it inside 'Good Fundamentals'. On the cyclical-trough caveat: it does not apply here — TDG is at a strong point in the aerospace cycle with accelerating revenue, not a depressed one; the de-rating lives in the multiple, not the fundamentals. Two data artifacts to disregard: the 12.6% dividend yield (lumpy special dividend/buyback, not recurring income) and the 'next FY' revenue estimate of $10.50B, which is essentially identical to FY26 guidance and is clearly stale. The non-empty notes list (excluded debt/equity, equity-movement distortion flags) plus the pending $1.07B Prince & Izant acquisition funded with new debt are why confidence is Low despite otherwise complete data.
AI-generated analysis for informational purposes only, not financial advice.