YUM — Yum! Brands, Inc.
YUM! Brands, Inc. (YUM) is a leading global quick-service restaurant enterprise that focuses on the creation, management, and franchising of its restaurant concepts internationally.
Price chart & technical analysis
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As of 2026-09-13, YUM trades at $140.92, near the bottom of its 52-week $137.33–$170.14 range, with RSI(14) at 34.2 and price 8.96% below its 200-day SMA. The stock has sold off roughly 12% over six months as management flagged a pressured US consumer, a longer KFC US turnaround, and normalizing Taco Bell traffic right after closing the $2.7B Pizza Hut divestiture.
Momentum is the story: as of 2026-09-13 the shares were down 6.53% in one week, 6.30% in one month, 8.71% in three months and 12.18% in six months, closing at $140.92 versus a 52-week high of $170.14. The proximate trigger was CFO Ranjith Roy's cautious commentary at the September 2026 Barclays Consumer Conference — a pressured US consumer, a longer-than-expected structural turnaround at KFC US, and lingering traffic normalization at Taco Bell after the summer Cyclospora food-safety disruption. Layered on top is a "show me" period following the completed $2.7B Pizza Hut sale (Yum China $1.2B, LongRange Capital $1.5B), which stripped out a segment and left investors recalibrating the earnings base. The bulls aren't absent — Wells Fargo upgraded to Overweight with a $175 target on cleaner post-divestiture earnings power, and the analyst consensus target of $175.33 implies ~24% upside — but the tape is clearly pricing near-term caution, not the upgrade case.
Top line is genuinely accelerating, margins are genuinely eroding, and reported EPS is distorted. Revenue grew 9.6% YoY in Q2 2025, 8.4% in Q3 2025, 6.4% in Q4 2025, 11.8% in Q1 2025 and then 15.2% in Q1 2026 and 12.3% in Q2 2026 ($2,169M vs $1,932M) — three straight quarters of double-digit growth, but that base still contains Pizza Hut and will reset lower once the disposal is reflected in continuing operations. The operating margin tells the opposite story: 34.4% in Q2 2024, 32.2% in Q2 2025, 30.2% in Q2 2026 — roughly 420bp of compression in two years, not a blip. GAAP EPS is unusable for trend work: Q2 2026 diluted EPS of $3.08 and net income of $853M versus $374M a year earlier reflect the divestiture gain, not operations (Q2 2026 operating income of $655M is only modestly above the $622M of Q2 2025). The cleanest signal in the dataset is cash: TTM free cash flow of $1,679M ($407M in Q2 2026, $341M in Q1 2026, $482M in Q4 2025, $449M in Q3 2025) is up 9.3% versus the prior TTM of $1,536M. Verdict: a real top-line and cash-flow uptrend, a real multi-year margin downtrend, and a quarter of reported earnings noise sitting on top of both.
Optically cheap, honestly fair. As of 2026-09-13, the stated TTM P/E is 17.59x on EPS of $8.004, but roughly $1.70/share of that was the one-off Pizza Hut gain in Q2 2026 — strip it out and normalized trailing EPS is closer to $6.30–$6.40. Against the next-FY consensus EPS of $6.581, the forward P/E is ~21.4x, versus a five-year average P/E of 25.87x. On sales, the discount looks real and is not gain-contaminated: P/S of 4.45x versus a five-year average of 5.39x. The 0.31 PEG ratio is a mechanical artifact of a distorted TTM base and should be ignored. Dividend yield is 2.04%. Reading it honestly: you are paying ~21x for roughly 4–6% forward EPS growth plus a 2% dividend, backed by a 98%-franchised model earning a 28.3% ROIC and a 31% operating margin. That is a fair-to-slightly-cheap price for this quality of asset, not a bargain and not expensive.
The single biggest trap here is the $8.00 TTM EPS versus $6.58 next-FY EPS gap — any screen showing YUM at 17.6x is reading a one-off divestiture gain as if it were earnings power. The market is correctly pricing the rebased business (~21x forward), which means the $140.92 price as of 2026-09-13 already embeds most of the CFO's September caution. What it does not embed is either a KFC US stabilization or a clean Taco Bell traffic recovery — those are still unproven. So the setup is asymmetric in a specific way: if the November 3–4 Q3 report shows Taco Bell US comps holding positive and KFC US flat-to-better, the multiple has legitimate room back toward the high-teens-to-20x mid-range and low-$160s; if Q3 confirms continued traffic softness, 20x on $6.60 lands near $132, which would break the $137.33 52-week low. In other words, the stock isn't mispricing earnings it has already delivered — it's waiting on evidence it hasn't yet produced.
As of 2026-09-13, the technical picture is a clean, unresolved downtrend. RSI(14) stood at 34.24 — weak, approaching but not yet in oversold territory (<30). Price at $140.92 was 6.13% below its 20-day SMA (~$150), 7.38% below its 50-day (~$152) and 8.96% below its 200-day (~$155), with all three averages stacked above price — the classic bearish alignment. The one-week return of -6.53% shows the selling actually accelerated into mid-September rather than exhausting. The 52-week low of $137.33 sits only ~2.6% below the current price, so the stock is testing a level that has held once. Entry-timing implication: an RSI near 34 with price near a 52-week low is where mean-reversion bounces typically start, but there is no bullish divergence, no MA reclaim and no volume capitulation in the data. Do not chase the first green candle — either wait for a decisive hold above $137 that survives a week, or for a reclaim of the 20-day (~$150), as confirmation the sellers are done.
- US consumer pressure — value-seeking behavior and lower traffic among lower-to-middle-income households, exactly the cohort YUM's US KFC and Taco Bell formats skew toward; this is the proximate cause of the September 2026 guidance caution.
- Rising Treasury yields compressing consumer discretionary multiples, compounded by YUM's own leverage: $9,462M of long-term debt against $674M of cash (net debt ~$8.8B, roughly 3x EBITDA) makes the equity rate-sensitive beyond the sector norm.
- GLP-1 weight-loss therapeutic adoption is a slow-burn structural question over fast-food demand; Yum's counter is digital infrastructure ("Byte by Yum!") and international white space, neither of which offsets a US volume headwind in the near term.
- Food, commodity and labor input inflation at the franchisee level — franchisees absorbing cost pressure eventually shows up as weaker unit economics, slower remodeling and reduced royalty growth.
- FX and emerging-market exposure: with KFC international growing units at 7% and now the primary growth engine post-Pizza Hut, currency translation and geopolitical friction in EM markets matter more to the story than they did two years ago.
- Q3 2026 earnings on November 3–4, 2026 — the first clean post-Pizza Hut report, and the primary test of Taco Bell US traffic normalization, KFC US stabilization, and how the resegmented P&L actually looks.
- Capital allocation of the $2.7B divestiture proceeds (buybacks, debt reduction, or new M&A — the CFO explicitly left the door open on portfolio additions), which could materially change the EPS and leverage trajectory.
- Continued international unit growth (KFC international running at 7%) and digital system sales mix above 60%, both of which support the long-term royalty-growth algorithm even while US traffic is soft.
- Analyst re-rating risk in both directions — Wells Fargo's upgrade to Overweight with a $175 target shows how quickly sentiment could flip if the simplification story gains traction, while a soft Q3 could pull the consensus $175.33 target down sharply.
- US traffic deterioration at Taco Bell and KFC — the company's own CFO flagged a pressured consumer and lingering post-Cyclospora normalization; if Q3 shows negative US comps, the earnings base and multiple both compress.
- KFC US structural turnaround taking longer than the market expects; management has already described the path as longer than originally modeled, and a prolonged drag would keep the domestic segment in perpetual fix-it mode.
- Multi-year operating margin erosion — 34.4% in Q2 2024 to 32.2% in Q2 2025 to 30.2% in Q2 2026 is roughly 420bp in two years, and there is no evidence in the data of that trend inflecting.
- Balance sheet: negative stockholders' equity of -$7,107M, a current ratio of 0.59, and $9,462M of long-term debt — a structural consequence of buybacks and franchising, but it leaves little cushion if rates stay elevated or FCF disappoints.
- Estimate reliability around the divestiture — the next-FY revenue consensus of $8,935M sits above the current TTM revenue base despite Pizza Hut's removal, suggesting some analyst models have not been fully rebased, which creates headline-miss risk in either direction.
YUM is a genuinely high-quality asset having a genuinely messy year. The franchise model is enviable — 98%+ franchised, 28.3% ROIC, 31% operating margin, $1,679M of TTM free cash flow growing 9.3% YoY, and a 2.04% dividend — but the near-term picture is three simultaneous resets: a segment divestiture, a soft US consumer, and a domestic KFC fix that management itself says is taking longer than planned. At $140.92 on 2026-09-13 you pay ~21.4x rebased forward EPS for roughly 4–6% growth, which is fair, not cheap, and does not compensate for the visible risk into the November 3–4 print. I would not own it here; I would want either evidence of US stabilization or a price closer to the low $130s, which is what 20x on $6.60 implies.
I applied a 22x forward P/E to next-FY consensus EPS of $6.581, giving $144.78, rounded to $145. The 22x is a deliberate discount to YUM's five-year average P/E of 25.87x, reflecting the post-divestiture loss of diversification, the CFO's September 2026 caution on US traffic, ~420bp of two-year operating margin erosion, and net debt of roughly $8.8B (~3x EBITDA) in a rising-rate environment. Cross-checking with an EV/EBITDA approach — forward EBITDA of roughly $3.0B on $8.94B of revenue and a ~31% operating margin, at 16x, less $8.8B of net debt across ~276M shares — lands at approximately $142, so the two methods corroborate a fair value in the mid-$140s, essentially flat to the $140.92 price on 2026-09-13.
I'd mark the 38.9 "Weak Fundamentals" score up roughly 14 points into the low-50s (Fair band), for three reasons the formula structurally cannot see. First, the ratio screener is penalizing features that are normal for a 98%-franchised business rather than signs of distress: negative book equity of -$7.1B from decades of buybacks (which is why D/E had to be excluded entirely) and a 0.59 current ratio from a model that collects royalties with almost no inventory or receivables. Second, the 3.99% accruals ratio — the dominant 65% leg of the quality pillar, flagging earnings running ahead of cash — is being triggered by the one-off Pizza Hut divestiture gain (Q2 2026 net income of $853M against operating income of $655M), not by deteriorating cash conversion; TTM free cash flow actually rose 9.3% YoY to $1,679M. Third, the growth score of 51.6 understates royalty-revenue durability. What keeps this at Partially Agree rather than Disagree is that the score is right about the things that matter: operating margin has compressed from 34.4% (Q2 2024) to 30.2% (Q2 2026), leverage is real, and the technicals and management commentary both point the same direction. Worth flagging separately: the formula's own "Cheap vs. its own history" valuation label (80.9) is itself contaminated by the same one-off gain inflating TTM EPS, so both the low fundamental score and the attractive valuation label are partly artifacts of the same transaction.
AI-generated analysis for informational purposes only, not financial advice.